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Abstract
Ericsson India is looking into the possibility to enter a new business in the country. The 
business is a “telecom site leasing” service which would be included in Ericsson’s service 
portfolio. Services are an increasingly important part of the company’s total revenues. 
Demand for so called turn-key services, meaning full implementation and control over a 
customer’s network, is an example of a service which is increasing in developing 
countries like India. Ericsson finds it therefore natural to grow within the service segment 
in these markets. The idea to expand the service offerings with an entrance to the so 
called tower industry emerged from identified new opportunities and a noted market 
demand. This thesis has investigated how Ericsson should enter this “site leasing” 
business in India.
The business is expected to take off with or without Ericsson, as regulators and the Indian 
government see many benefits to the economy with the concept. Since the aim of the 
concept is to achieve as many tenants as possible per tower, infrastructure costs are 
expected to decrease per operator. The cost reductions is the main reason for the belief 
that the service is expected to improve coverage in rural areas, which at the present have 
a network penetration of less than 2%. The service is also supported by the government 
and the regulators because it is estimated to improve countryside and city esthetics and
network capacity in urban areas, which are facing problems with insufficient space. 
It was found through various analyses that Ericsson should invest in a pilot project 
initially to minimize risks. After an evaluation of the pilot project it is recommended to 
start an aggressive investment strategy. In this way it is believed that Ericsson will raise 
barriers for entering competitors and thus create a more profitable business. The strategy 
is also believed to overcome the weakness of the Ericsson non-associated tower brand 
easier through faster implementation of the business on a wider scale than competitors. 
Moreover, it was also found that Ericsson should differentiate the service compared to 
competitors. Ericsson has the capability to supply customers with a service with 
perceived benefits, thereof the strategy. It is estimated that Ericsson will alone be able to 
hold such a position in the industry and thus the incentive to price their service slightly 
higher than competitors. It is furthermore recommended that Ericsson should monitor the 
new business closely to correct dissatisfying performance in time. 
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Sammanfattning
Ericsson Indien tittar för nuvarande in på alternativet att erbjuda en ny tjänst till sina 
kunder. Tjänsten är en uthyrningstjänst, vilken innebär att Ericsson hyr ut passiv ”site”-
infrastruktur till operatörer. En anledning till att Ericsson funderat på tjänstesektorn som 
ett rätt naturligt område att utöka sina tjänster inom, är dess ökade betydelse inom 
företaget då den utgör en allt större del av koncernens inkomster. Den ökande efterfrågan 
i utvecklingsländer som Indien på den så kallade ”turn-key” tjänsten, vilken innebär att 
Ericsson förser kunden med ett komplett ansvar över utbyggnad och operation av nätverk, 
är ett exempel på en sådan utveckling. När möjligheten att starta en ”uthyrning av siter” 
tjänst uppkom blev därför de många fördelarna med en sådan tillväxt snabbt tydliga. Det 
här exjobbet undersöker därför hur Ericsson bäst ska gå in i den här s.k. ”tower 
industrin”.
Att hyra ut ”siter” till multipla operatörer är en tjänst som förväntas startas i Indien med 
eller utan Ericsson. Detta för det statliga stödet av tjänsten. Eftersom målet med tjänsten 
är att locka till sig så många operatörer som möjligt till varje ”site” för förbättrad vinst, 
kommer också operatörernas kostnad minska för den passiva infrastruktur delen. Dessa 
konstandsminskningar är den huvudsakliga orsaken till tron på att tjänsten kommer ge 
incitament till en större utvidgning av nät i rurala områden som just nu har en täckning på 
mindre än 2%. Ännu en anledning till varför staten stöttar en utveckling av tjänsten är för 
att den förväntas förbättra estetiken i landskapet genom färre byggda torn och en höjning 
av kapaciteten i de överbelastade nätverken i städerna som står inför ett problem med 
otillräcklig mark.
Genom olika analyser i exjobbet fann man att Ericsson borde investera i ett pilot projekt 
initialt för att minimera riskerna. Efter en utvärdering av projektet rekommenderas en mer 
aggressiv investerings strategi. Genom en sådan aggressiv strategi förväntas Ericsson 
kunna höja barriärer för inkommande konkurrenter. Färre konkurrenter skapar större 
möjligheter för högre marginaler och därmed högre vinster. Det är också förväntat att 
strategin kommer lättare besegra en av Ericssons största barriärer, det icke-associerade 
Ericsson märket i ”tower industrin”. Exjobbet presenterar också den funna mest 
strategiska placeringen för den nya tjänsten i industrin. Ericsson bör differentiera sin 
tjänst jämfört med konkurrenterna, då företaget har större möjligheter att erbjuda en 
bredare tjänst. Den bredare tjänsten inkluderar möjligheten för Ericsson att förse kunder 
med komplett lösning, från uppbyggnad till underhåll och operation av alla delar av 
nätverket. Ericsson kan exempelvis erbjuda en uthyrnings tjänst av ”siter” tillsammans 
med deras ”turn-key” tjänst. Behovet för kunder att bara behöva gå till en ”one-stop-
shop” för samtliga tjänster och produkter anses skapa en konkurrenskraftig position. 
Därför finns det anledningar att tro att Ericsson kan ta ut något högre priser än 
konkurrenter. Slutligen rekommenderar exjobbet företaget att övervaka den nya tjänstens 
utvecklig på marknaden för att kunna korrigera strategin i rätt tid.   
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11. Introduction
The chapter will discuss and clarify the background, main purpose and sub purpose, and 
delimitations of the thesis. It will also present the disposition of the thesis in order to get 
a clear picture of the structure and content of the paper.  
1.1 Background
India is today one of the fastest growing telecom markets in the world. With around five 
million new subscribers per month the market holds great business opportunities for 
telecom vendors like Ericsson (TRAI, 2006). Even though Ericsson is presently the 
market leader the company must continuously review its service and product portfolio 
and look for new opportunities to stay on the top.  
Recent changes in the market have lead to an opening of a new business in India, the 
main scope being to lease out space on telecommunication sites to multiple operators. 
The business has been present in other markets for several years, but has not until 
recently been applicable in India. Today there exist nine major operators in the country 
and each operator owns their own sites, where the tower and the equipment needed to run 
a network is put up. In many areas three towers from three different operators can be seen 
next to each other. To cut expenses operators could instead share one tower. In this way 
many current market challenges, like the almost nonexistent network coverage in rural 
areas, esthetic concerns, and lack of space in urban areas, are expected to improve. Even 
though all of these challenges are of importance to address, the challenge of bringing 
network to rural India is viewed to be the most crucial. Network coverage in rural areas is
expected to not only result in a growth of the GDP but also in improved conditions for 
India’s poor rural population. The government of India has realized these benefits to the
economy and to the individual citizen and has therefore started a project to kick-start an 
implementation of the idea. The government has also realized that a third party is most 
likely needed to supply the market with the tower sharing solution because of the present 
difficulties for the operators to run the business on their own. Such difficulties are for 
example the rivalry culture between the operators and their need to focus more on their
core business due to the immense market growth. The project has therefore lead to a new 
business opportunity for companies connected to the telecom market.
Ericsson has identified this new business opportunity as a possibility to grow in the 
increasingly important service segment. Ericsson believes, among other positive effects, 
that such a service could imply an added value to their customers. As an effect, Ericsson 
is presently more interested in how to enter the business than if they should enter. The 
thesis will therefore investigate and analyze the market and its expectations and give 
recommendations for a successful entry strategy.
1.2 Purpose
The main purpose and aim of the thesis is through various analyses answer the question; 
how should Ericsson enter the “telecom site leasing” business in India. In order to reach 
2an answer to the “how” question, it is necessary to deal with the question if Ericsson 
should enter the industry. It is necessary because it gives a broader platform to stand on 
when suggesting entrance strategies. The thesis aims at answering this question through 
firstly a model which explains the internal course of action and secondly the internal and 
external strategic choices. The hope is that the thesis will contribute to the material 
needed by Ericsson to make a successful business entrance in the market. 
1.4 Delimitations
The thesis has been limited to a general strategic discussion not including into depth 
evaluation of the technological platform. The technology of how a mobile network is run 
is very complex. When necessary to include technical aspects simplifications of the real 
world will be made.  
The thesis does also not include a thorough business intelligence analysis of the market 
players and possible partners. It will hence not go into detail of each such possible player
and partner, but will instead generalize them into groups. The difficulty in extracting such 
information is one reason behind this limitation. The sensitiveness of the subject and 
difficulties in the Indian market are two other reasons. The information in this area will 
therefore be taken from the internet and personal contacts within Ericsson.
The thesis has also been limited to only include the result of various cost calculations.
The calculations have been made from partially sensitive numbers for Ericsson and will 
therefore not be made public.  
1.5 Target Group
The principal target group of the thesis is Ericsson’s service unit in India. Other target 
groups include students at the Industrial Engineering and Management program and the 
Production Management department at Lund’s Institute of Technology.
1.6 Disposition of the Thesis
The first chapter gives an introduction to the paper. It explains the background, the 
purpose and delimitations, and clarifies the disposition of the thesis.
The second chapter presents the methodology and the theoretical framework. The 
methodology explains how the information to the thesis has been gathered. The 
information will be categorized as primary or secondary, the  primary mostly being 
interviews and discussions with Ericsson employees, the secondary mostly being desktop 
research. The methodology will also discuss the validity and reliability of the thesis. The 
theoretical framework will moreover define and present the theoretical content of the 
thesis. The theoretical content here is the tools and models used in the analyses. 
The third chapter provides the reader with information about the Indian telecom market. 
The Indian market is different from the Swedish market and needs to be explained in 
order to understand the need for the proposed business. 
3The fourth chapter deals with the concept of the “telecom site leasing” business. The 
chapter will define the concept and discuss various opportunities and challenges with it. It 
will also present a global study of the business in selected countries. The chapter aims at 
laying a foundation for understanding the business and why Ericsson wants to enter it. 
The fifth chapter presents Ericsson India. The chapter discusses the growth, the services, 
the people, and the expectations of the business. The chapter will be an important ground 
to draw the internal factors conclusions from.
The sixth chapter analyzes the business out of an Ericsson perspective. The models and 
tools presented in the theoretical framework will here be applied to the content of the 
thesis. The aim of the analyses is to give a picture of the industry to understand external 
factors, but also give a picture of Ericsson’s strengths and weaknesses to understand 
internal factors. The analyses will be the platform which the entry strategy will be built 
on.
The seventh and final chapter summarizes the result of the thesis. It will provide the 
reader with an internal action plan, which should be executed before, during, and after 
entering the market. The chapter will also present the concluded entry strategy, both how 
to prepare internally and where and how to enter externally. The chapter will, with this 
conclusion, answer the question which was the main purpose of the thesis; how Ericsson 
should enter the “telecom site leasing” business. The thesis ends with some 
recommendations for further studies in order to improve the knowledge base and hence 
the strategy.
42. Practical and Theoretical Framework
The practical and theoretical framework chapter explains the methodology of the thesis 
and the models and tools used. The practical framework aims at guiding the thesis target 
group through the research and how it was executed. The aim of the theoretical 
framework is to present the models and tools used in the thesis and why they have been 
chosen in order to come to the conclusion.   
2.1 Methodology
To gather information for the thesis three main research methods have been used, these 
being interviews, general observations, and desktop-based research. Desktop research has 
been the natural start to understand the market, the concept, Ericsson India, and the 
theoretical part of the models used in the analyses. When continuing to the Ericsson 
perspective and applying the theoretical models to the market and Ericsson, the use of
primary sources have been necessary. Observations made of working procedures and 
cultural differences have also contributed to the analyses. 
These methods have been chosen with regard to the purpose and the market situation. 
Difficulties, as will be further elaborated on in the primary sources chapter, has prevented 
the use of some other methods. 
2.1.1 Primary Sources
The primary sources used for interviews and discussions have been people from Ericsson
both in India and head office in Stockholm. The Indian research was performed in Delhi, 
Ericsson’s Indian head office, for two months in the months of August and September. 
These primary sources have helped with the understanding of the market, the business, 
and Ericsson’s expectations. They have also provided with all the information necessary 
to perform the cost/profit analysis, statistics, and internal reports. 
The choice of the primary sources has been a natural result of discussions with the thesis 
company supervisor. The supervisor, Mr Rajul Kumar, has many times provided with 
helpful tips of people to talk to for information regarding different questions. In most 
cases these tips have lead to talks with the Ericsson India’s manager of network roll-out 
(NRO), Mr Vibhas Sharma.   
It should be noted that the “corporate” culture in India and the sensitiveness of the topic 
made it difficult to gain trust for an open discussion of various issues within Ericsson 
India. A general reluctance to share information was a challenge which was difficult to 
overcome. The reluctance to share is believed to not only stem from the sensitiveness of 
the topic but also the lack of professional merits and maybe also the fact of me being a 
woman. In India professional status is very important to get access to information and 
time from employees. Unfortunately it is also a country which is far from equality 
between men and females.     
52.1.2 Secondary Sources
As mentioned, desktop research has been a widely used method in the paper. The 
Ericsson internal database, which all Ericsson employees get access to, has been an 
important source of information. Many consultation papers and relevant news articles 
have been extracted from this database. These papers have contributed to the 
understanding of the market and the business concept, but also in the understanding of 
Ericsson. 
Another important secondary data source has been the annual reports from the American 
tower industry. Companies listed on one US’s stock exchanges must follow a certain 
format, called 10K, when writing their annual reports (U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission, 2006). Thanks to this law the annual reports contain a lot of information, 
both detailed and general. These reports have therefore contributed to a better 
understanding of the tower industry and the potential of a similar business idea in the 
Indian market.  
Other sources which have been of great importance for the study of the market and the 
concept are the websites of the Cellular Operators Association of India (COAI), Telecom 
Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI), and the Department of Telecommunication (DoT). 
As for the theoretical part of the models used in the analyses, the Harvard Business 
Review has proven to be yet another great source.  
2.1.3 Validity and Reliability
The thesis contains sources of error that may affect the degree of validity in the analysis 
results. Six main such sources have been identified; lack of more primary sources, 
objectivity, cultural difficulties, internet reliability, validity of assumptions made from 
the American tower industry, and varying results from different secondary sources. These 
will be discussed below.
Firstly, the sensitiveness of the topic, being a strategic proposition, brought some 
difficulties, as already mentioned, when collecting information. The research has 
therefore mostly been made from written secondary sources. It is estimated that the 
results would be more reliable if more primary sources would have been used. The 
viewpoints from the wireless service providers themselves and the regulators in the 
country would, for example, have provided with a more reliable analysis.  
Secondly, it should be understood that the objectivity of the thesis can be questioned 
since the research has been done at Ericsson for Ericsson. The thesis will naturally be 
influenced by Ericsson’s believes of the “telecom site leasing” market.
Thirdly, the cultural differences have affected the possibility to collect information from 
the primary sources and hence the results. As mentioned, the lack of professional status 
and being a female are two aspects of these differences which are estimated to have 
affected the time taken by these sources to contribute to more accurate results. 
6Fourthly, information has been extracted from the internet, which as a result has 
contributed to the final conclusion. The internet is an obvious possible source of error. 
Fifthly, many assumptions have been made from the American tower industry. The 
assumptions may be a source of error if the differences of the markets prove to be larger 
than expected.  
Finally, Ericsson has, as most companies, a wide internal database where many reports 
can be found. These reports are mainly written by various consultant companies, which 
sometimes use varying data. This data has to some extent been used and contributed to 
the results. It is estimated that the data could be a possible source of error.  
2.2 Theoretical Framework
To answer the question how Ericsson should enter the business of “telecom site leasing” 
in India, the thesis will provide the reader with five analyses; cost/profit analysis, barriers 
of entry analysis, five forces analysis, SWOT analysis, and a financial respective partner 
risk analysis. These analyses will lead to a conclusion to the above question. The 
conclusion will in its turn be presented as a model, the model best explained as an action 
plan specific for Ericsson to follow for a successful entry. The analyses will also lead to a 
conclusion of a strategic position, in terms of price vs. perceived service benefits, of the
business in the industry. 
The reason why these models have been chosen is because each of them gives different 
valuable insights to the market. An investment and sensitivity analysis highlights the 
potential of the business, but also the risks. The “barriers of entry”- and “five forces” -
analysis gives information about which forces and barriers is needed to decrease or rise to 
increase profitability. The SWOT analysis gives a clear picture of Ericsson’s strengths 
which should be taken advantage of in the entry strategy. It also addresses the threats and 
weaknesses which Ericsson needs to look out for. They have hence been evaluated to 
provide the best support to draw the conclusion from. Each analysis tool used in the 
thesis is presented below
2.2.1 Investment Analysis
A cost/profit analysis is of great importance to understand how to strategically price ones 
services and or products. In such an analysis all costs and revenues associated with the 
service/product should be included over the life of the investment. In this way the profit 
margin can be viewed over the years. To further analyze the profitability of the business 
calculations as Net Present Value (NPV), Pay Back (PB) period, and Internal Rate of 
Return (IRR) should be done. The mathematical formulas can be seen below.
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When the initial cost analysis is finished a sensitivity analysis is easily performed. 
Through the sensitivity analysis both different risks and opportunities can be relieved.    
2.2.2 Barriers of Entry Analysis1
When entering a new business, as when entering a new market, six major entry barriers 
exist; economies of scale, brand identification, capital requirement, cost disadvantages 
independent of size, access to distribution, and government policy (Porter, 1979). The 
acquisition route of entry, which many firms choose, faces other problems which will not 
be discussed here (Yip, 1982). The “barriers of entry” analysis is important to understand 
the difficulties and gateways when entering a business.
Economies of scale – The economies of scale barrier determine entry by forcing the 
aspirant either to come in on a large scale or to accept a cost disadvantage.
Brand identification – Brand identification creates a barrier by forcing entrants to spend 
heavily to overcome customer loyalty.
Capital requirement – The need to invest large financial resources in order to compete 
creates a barrier to entry.
Cost disadvantages independent of size – Incumbent companies may have cost 
advantages not available to potential rivals, no matter what their size and attainable 
economies of scale. These advantages can e.g. stem from the effects of the learning curve 
(and the experience curve) and proprietary technology solutions.
Access to distribution – An entrant in any market or business must secure distribution of 
its services.
Government policy – The government can limit or even foreclose entry to industries with 
such controls as license requirements. The government can also play a major indirect role 
by affecting entry barriers through institutional voids as lack of infrastructure. 
                                                
1 Source is Porter, 1979 if not otherwise stated.
Ct = Cash flow
i = discount rate
t = time of the cash flow
N = total time of project
I = project initial investment
NPV = Net Present Value
PB period =Pay Back Period
IRR = Internal Rate of Return
82.2.3 Porter’s Five Forces Analysis2
The five forces analysis pictures the profit potential of an industry. The weaker the forces 
are collectively the greater the potential. The goal of the analysis is to find a position in 
the industry where the business can best defend itself against these forces or can 
influence them in its favor. In order to find this position one needs to analyze each force.
Industry Rivalry – The profit potential of an industry is high if the rivalry or competition 
is low. The industry rivalry is normally measured by how high the concentration of the 
market share is divided among the four largest firms. A low concentration ratio indicates 
that the industry is characterized by many rivals, no one of which have a significant 
market share. Such a market is more competitive. A high concentration ratio is, on the 
other hand, an industry with few rivals with large portions of the market share.
Threat of substitute products – The profitability of a market is high if the threat of 
substitute products or services is low. The products/services that one should keep a close 
watch on are those that can improve the price-performance trade-off with the industry’s 
product, or those that are produced by industries earning high profits. Substitutes often 
emerge through either price reductions or performance improvements.
Bargaining power of customers – The power of the customers can influence the prices of 
the product/service substantially. The higher the power of the customers the lower the 
profitability is of the industry. 
Threat of new entrants – If the threat of new entrants is high, the barriers of entry being 
low, the profitability of an industry is lower.
                                                
2 Source is Porter, 1979.
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Figure 2.1. An industry’s five forces (Porter, 1979)
9Bargaining power of suppliers – Alike the bargaining power of customers, the higher the 
power of the suppliers the lower the profitability is of the industry. 
2.2.4 SWOT Analysis3
Another well known analysis tool is the SWOT model. The model is useful in order to 
realize and understand both the strengths and opportunities, but also the weaknesses and 
threats of a business. The goal of the analysis is to highlight the internal weak areas 
which need attention and strong areas which should be put emphasis on toward the 
customer. The goal is furthermore to understand and identify the external threats and 
opportunities of the business. The SWOT analysis gives further input how to strategically 
position oneself in the industry.
2.2.5 The Strategy Clock Analysis4
The strategy clock analysis clarifies the competitive strategic options of a new business. 
To win customers in an industry with a number of players a company needs to place its 
products or services in a strategic position. The strategic clock represent different such 
positions.
‘No frills’ - The ‘no frills’ strategy focuses on low prices and not quality or extra benefits 
to the customer. Such a service/product fits well in a price sensitive market segment. 
Risk: narrow market segment reach.
Low price – The low price strategy focuses the competitive power on price while still 
offering the same quality and benefits of the service as competitors. Risks: price wars and 
low margins; need to be cost leader.
Hybrid – The hybrid strategy tries to compete with price and quality/benefits 
simultaneously. Risk: need to have a low cost base.
Differentiation – The differentiation strategy aims at delivering high quality and 
extraordinary service benefits to the customers either to a premium price or similar price 
as competitors. Risks: added value enough to bear a premium price or need to have a low 
cost base to compete with similar price as competitors.
Focused differentiation – The focused differentiation strategy focus on a small market 
segment capable and willing to pay a higher price for high service benefits. Such a 
service/product is usually supported by a strong brand. Risks: narrow market segment 
reach and perceived service/product benefits.
                                                
3 Source is Johnson, Scholes, and Wittington, 2005
4 Source of analysis tool: Johnson, Scholes, and Wittington, 2005
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3. The Indian Market
In this section information about the present telecom industry in India will be presented. 
The chapter has been included in order to understand the need for shared infrastructure 
and its role in the Indian market. Topics that will be dealt with include history of mobile 
services in India, market growth, stakeholders, and industry challenges.
3.1 Indian market
India consists of 28 states as shown in figure 3.1. The telecom market, on the other hand, 
is divided into 23 circles (see table 3.1 and figure 3.2), which roughly correspond to the 
Indian states with the additions of the 4 city circles and some coalitions between the 
smaller states. The circles are divided into Metropolitan, A, B, and C circles. The division 
is based on market size and potential according to the government, A being the largest 
market with highest potential. 
At the present it lives around 1104 million people in India5. 70% live in the rural areas 
and 30% in the urban areas. India's population is still growing and is expected to pass 
China as the world’s most populous country before 2030 (Haub and Sharma, 2006). 
                                                
5 Source: National Commission on Population, Government of India
Telecom Circles in India
Metropolitan 
Circles
A Circles B Circles C Circles
1. Delhi 5. Maharastra 10. Kerala 18. Himachal Pradesh
2. Mumbai 
(Bombay)
6. Gujarat 11. Punjab 19. Bihar
3. Kolkata 
(Calcutta)
7. Andhra  
Pradesh
12. Haryana 20. Orissa
4. Channai (Madras) 8. Karnataka 13. Uttar Pradesh (W) 21. Assam
9. Tamil Nadu 14. Uttar Pradesh (E)
22. Northeastern states 
excluding Assam
15. Rajasthan 23. Jammu & Kashmir
16. Madhya Pradesh
17. West Bengal &   
Andaman and 
Nicobar islands
Table 3.1. Division of the Indian telecom market.
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Figure 3.1. Map of India and its states.
Figure 3.2. Map of India and its telecom circles.
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3.2 Mobile Telecom History
In India the first cellular license was approved in 1994 and the first network built in 1995. 
In order for the government to have a say in shaping the growth of the telecom industry 
two major policies have been introduced during the years. These have been of importance 
for the growth of the telecom market. A National Telecom Policy (NTP) has been 
announced in 1994 and 1999. The NTP’94 provided the market with increased incentives 
for telecom service providers to grow in the market, as the main objective of the policy 
was to reach villages across India with telecommunication services at affordable prices. It 
was announced to provide increased activity to the liberalization process (TRAI, 2004). 
Two cellular operators from the private sector were at the time introduced. Since then the 
number of active operators have increased to eleven. The NTP’99 was also a growth 
catalyst with the annunciation that revenue share6 was permitted. Furthermore, four 
operators were now allowed to compete in the market. A summary of the events is shown 
below in figure 3.3. 
3.3 Market Growth
The NTPs have, as described, played a major role in the growth of mobile telephony in 
India. As seen in figure 3.4 the subscription base has grown exponentially in the last 
couple of years. Most recently, from April 2005 to March 2006, the annual growth 
                                                
6 Revenue share means that the wireless service providers can partially or fully pay for their equipment or 
other services via a percentage of their incurred revenue for a negotiated time period.
Telecom 
sector 
liberized. 
Private 
sector 
allowed to 
participate.
NTP´94
First cellular 
license is approved 
in India. 
NTP’99
Introduction 
of improving 
reforms  e.g.
revenue 
share.
Telecom 
Regulatory 
Authority 
of India 
(TRAI) is 
introduced
Cellular 
licenses 
expand to 19 
more telecom 
circles. 
Kolkata gets 
India’s first 
cellular 
network.
1992    1994             1995     1997                           1999  2000
Incoming 
calls fee is 
abolished.
Figure 3.3. An overview of major events and growth catalysts in the history of cellular telephony in India. 
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reached 72.6% (TRAI, 2006) and it is presently added around 4-5 million new mobile 
subscribers every month (TRAI, 2006). The number of monthly newly added subscribers, 
to get some perspective of the immense growth, is equal to the total population of 
Norway. 
The growth of mobile subscribers has brought with it many positive effects on the 
country, as a higher overall economical growth. One negative effect of the growth rate, 
on the other hand, is the operators’ lack of capability to keep up with the demand. As a 
consequence, one problem that has emerged is high congestion levels between networks 
(TRAI, 2005). In order to overcome such a challenge operators in India have developed a 
need for suppliers of total network infrastructure to focus more on their core business. It 
is clear that equipment vendors are more often hired for these so called turn-key projects 
in developing markets than in more mature ones. 
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The presently exponentially high growth rate is expected to slow down as seen in figure 
3.4 above. Future governmental forecasts predict that the country will reach around 200 
million subscribers at the end of 2007 and 500 million by 2010 (Raj, 2006). The 
calculated average growth rate from 2006 to 2010 would thus be 45% per year, to be 
compared to the above stated growth of around 72% the previous year. Still, almost five 
times as many users from June 2006 to the end of December 2010 are predicted with this 
forecast. 
3.4 Stakeholders
In the Indian telecom sector five major stakeholders are recognized; operators, special 
interest groups, government/regulators, equipment vendors, and customers. These are 
going to be discussed in the following chapter. 
3.4.1 Operators
The current competitive outlook among operators in India is fierce, the reason being the 
high number of operators and the price sensitive consumer market. Even though the 
NTP’99, with the introduction of revenue share, has (as seen in figure 3.5) been the 
biggest contributor to the decreased tariff fees, the competitiveness of the market is also 
regarded as an important catalyst. India has today one of the lowest tariff fees in the 
world (TRAI, 2006), with tariffs around 0.02 USD/minute7. The operators can support 
the low tariffs because of their scale advantages. The number of subscribers which are 
reached with just one tower in the densely populated areas are high, resulting in a rather 
low cost per subscriber. The average revenue per user8 (ARPU) is around 8.0 USD 
(TRAI, 2006). The ARPU is lower than western markets (ARPU in Sweden is around 28 
USD9), but the scale of the market makes it high enough for high total profits. The 
current market leader among the operators has total revenues of their mobile services of 
                                                
7 ≈ average extracted from operators’ website
8 Measured per month
9 Source: TeliaSonera’s website
Figure 3.5. Cellular mobile growth and operators’ average effective charge per minute. (TRAI (2004) p. 5)
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1.7 billion10 USD, to be compared to Sweden’s wireless service provider market leader 
TeliaSonera’s revenue for mobile services of 1.5 billion11 USD. 
There exist eleven wireless service providers in India. They differ in size and geographic 
presence as shown in table 3.2 and figure 3.6. Bharti is currently the market leader 
closely followed by Reliance Infocomm and BSNL. As of July 2006 the private operators 
held an 80% market share while the governmental owned (BSNL & MTNL) held a 20% 
share of the cellular market. 
                                                
10 Source: Bharti’s 2005 annual report. Note that due to increased sales their revenue has increased. It is 
estimated that their annual revenue for their mobile services for 2006 will be around 2.3 billion USD.
11 Source: calculated from TeliaSonera’s website, only including mobile services in Sweden.
Operator Statistics
Operators Network Circles
Mobile 
subscribers (M)
Bharti Tele-Venture (GSM) all circles 23.09
Reliance Infocomm (GSM & CDMA) 1 – 16, 18 – 20 22.52
Bharat Sanchar Nigam LTD (BSNL) (GSM & 
CDMA)
3 – 23 21.19
Hutch/BPL (GSM) 1 – 15, 17 18.29
TATA Teleservices (CDMA) 1 - 20 10.36
IDEA Cellular (GSM)
1, 5 – 7, 10, 12, 13 – 16, 
18
8.54
Aircel/Dishnet (GSM) 4, 9, 17, 20 - 23 3.20
Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Ltd (MTNL) (GSM & 
CDMA)
1 – 2 2.18
Spice (GSM) 8, 11 2.05
HFCL (CDMA) 11 0.12
Shyam Telelink (CDMA) 15 0.065
Table  3.2. Operator statistics.
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Operators Market Share
Bharti, 20.7
BSNL, 19
Reliance, 20.2
Hutchinson/BPL, 
16.4
IDEA, 7.7
Aircel, 2.9
Spice, 1.8
TATA, 9.3
M TNL, 1.9
HFCL, 0.11
Shyam Telelink, 
0.06
Bharti
BSNL
Reliance
Hutchinson/BPL
IDEA
Aircel
Spice
M TNL
HFCL
Shyam Telelink
TATA
3.4.2 Special Interest Groups
The special interest groups, for mostly COAI and AUSPI, are another rather powerful 
stakeholder in the Indian telecom market. The groups are shortly presented below.
The Cellular Operators Association of India (COAI) is an independent non-profit 
organization for GSM operators active in the Indian market. Its objective is to protect 
member interests through its rather strong influence on policy making.      
The Association of Unified Telecom Service Providers of India (AUSPI) is equivalent to 
COAI but for CDMA operators. AUSPI is also a non-profit organization whose objective 
is to collect and distribute knowledge, attract investments, and interact in policy making. 
Other special interest groups include the Association of Basic Telecom Operators 
(ABTO), the Telecom Equipment Manufacturer Association, the Telecom Industries & 
Services Association, and Core Group of Telecom Industries Association. These groups 
hold substantially less influence power than the COAI and AUSPI. 
3.4.3 Government/Regulators
The third identified major stakeholder is the government/regulators. All of the regulators 
in India have as their chief goal to enhance the telecom market growth in a sustainable 
fashion including both urban and rural areas. In order to do this different parties are 
involved with various responsibilities and authorities.  
In India the Department of Communication (DoT), working under the ministry of 
communication and information technology, handles and set all policies, licensing, and 
coordination matters within the field of telecommunication. 
Figure 3.6. Operators and their market share.
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Figure 3.7. Wireless service providers and their respective market share in India (TRAI, 2006) 
The Telecom Regulator Authority of India (TRAI) is an independent organization 
established by the government of India. The authority’s role is to regulate the 
telecommunication business in India. It controls and supervises the quality of telecom 
services, operational issues, consumer interests, pricing, and any unethically business to 
name a few responsibilities. To achieve fair competition among the operators TRAI 
issues regulations, orders, and directives when the need arises. 
The Telecom Disputes Settlement and Appellate Tribunal (TDSAP) role is, as the name 
suggests, settling disputes between the licensors and the licensees, between service 
providers, and between service providers and groups of consumers. The introduction 
initiative of the tribunal was taken by the TRAI.  
3.4.4 Equipment Vendors
The fourth identified stakeholder is the equipment vendors. Today, all presently existing 
equipment vendors are active in the Indian market. No vendor wants to miss out on 
business deals in one of the fastest growing telecom markets in the world (China and 
India are in the top, but the number one country changes back and forward) (TRAI, 
2006). Operators are buying telecom equipment fast and in large quantities to keep up 
with demand. Great business opportunities thus arise for the equipment vendors, who are 
increasingly trying to target developing markets to keep growth up and cover for the 
more mature Western markets. Respective vendor and their market share specific to India 
is presented below in figure 3.7.
Vendor Market Share (GSM + CDMA)
Nokia
20.3%
Others
1.4%
Ericsson
30.6%
Huawei
0.7%
Nortel
3.1%
M otorola
15.7%
Lucent/A lcatel
21.8%
Siemens
5.9%
ZTE
0.6%
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3.4.5 Customer Needs
The customers of mobile services are also a stakeholder. The bargaining power of a 
dispersed group like the end users in a big and rather poor country like India is concluded 
to be weak. 
Customer needs are estimated to be the same in India as everywhere else in the world 
when it comes to telecom networks. Customers want to have a country wide geographical 
coverage of their mobile network, good quality of the services (e.g. no congestion 
between networks), and reasonable prices for usage of the network. The last statement 
may be more specific to India with concern to the price sensitive market. Presently, only 
the last need is fulfilled, both the network reach and the quality are not at customer 
satisfaction. 
3.5 Market Challenges
The increase of telecom density (mobile + fixed) and the exponential growth of mobile 
subscribers have led to a faster economical development of India, but it has also brought 
some challenges and issues along with it. The rural teledensity is lagging behind while 
the urban growth has skyrocketed (see figure 3.8). The fast urban growth is almost 
entirely due to the growth of mobile services in the areas. Both markets are presently 
facing expansion problems, but for different reasons. These challenges are going to be 
discussed below.         
3.5.1 Rural Market – high cost for infrastructure & operations
The rural areas were as of October 2004 contributing to about 25% of India’s total GDP 
(TRAI, 2004). The contribution is estimated to still be the same due to the low growth 
rate of the area. Agricultural activities are presently the largest activity in rural India 
(Indian Embassy, 2006). Agriculture is India’s biggest contributing sector to the national 
GDP. Presently, it contributes with almost 33% of the total GDP (Indian Embassy, 2006). 
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Figure 3.8.Difference between urban and rural teledensity. (TRAI, 2005; Times News Network, 2006; Lee, 
2006)
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The Indian government and TRAI have tried to encourage more operators to invest in the 
rural markets. The result of an increase of telecom density in rural areas is an 
enhancement of efficiency and efficacy of the already existing commercial and 
agricultural activities. One example is the possibility for farmers via telecom services to 
access information on agriculture topics like trading prices and fertilizers (Prahalad, 
2005). The telecom sector is counted as being the single strongest factor to achieve 
economic growth (TRAI, 2004). The regulators have not succeeded as of today with 
pushing the operators to expand the telecom network to these areas and thus the rural 
market is still lagging behind the expected growth levels. As of July 2006 the cellular 
market penetration in the rural areas was 1.87% (Times News Network, 2006). 
As mentioned, around 70% of India’s population lives in the rural areas, meaning around 
770 million people. The possibilities for the operators to increase their subscription base 
in these areas should therefore be immense, but as the buying power here is substantially 
lower than in the cities and customers are more dispersed, benefits get reduced. The 
deployment of wireless telecom services in rural India have, on the other hand, some 
advantages compared to other developing countries. A wide expanding Optical Fibre 
network already exists through out the country reaching rural areas. The reason why the 
operators still haven’t moved their business further out in the country stems from various 
reasons, these being discussed below (summary based on various sources within Ericsson 
India). 
1. The vast growth of the telecom market since the introduction of mobile networks 
in 1995 has led to problems for the operators to keep up. Most operators have 
therefore focused on the bigger city areas to win as many subscribers as possible 
in the least amount of time and the least amount of investments. The cost per 
subscriber is higher in the rural areas.
2. Even though an Optical Fibre network already exists to a great extent it is far 
from the total last mile infrastructure of a network (see figure 3.9 for a graphical 
representation of the problem). Costs of building a last mile infrastructure for a 
mobile network is a huge investment. 
3. Rural areas incur higher costs for logistics, maintenance, and electricity due to the 
remote locations and lack of availability of electricity. Generators are needed as 
power supply for the equipment in these areas. 
4. One might expect the governmental owned operators (BSNL & MTNL) to take on 
the responsibility to build out the infrastructure, since this will help the growth of 
the GDP faster. BSNL does also take some responsibility, but they are slowed 
down because of the first reason stated above (see bullet 1) and the bureaucracy 
environment within the company. Furthermore, it is crucial for BSNL to run their 
business in a cost sustainable fashion to stay competitive to the market 
competitors.
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The TRAI’s Universal Service Objectives (USO) has made several attempts to get around 
these problems shown in figure 3.10 below.
                      
Delhi Mumbai
Backbone (Optical Fibre network)
Last mile 
infrastructure
Rural 
village
Existing railway, Optical Fibre 
network
Last mile infrastructure missing to 
cover village with mobile network.
Basic network build-up between cities.
Rural network problem
Figure 3.10. TRAI’s Universal Service Objectives (TRAI (2004) p. 14)
Figure 3.9. The basic structure of problem of a mobile network.
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Neither of these objectives has succeeded in achieving the goal of a faster increase of 
teledensity in the rural areas. The gap between the urban and rural has instead grown, as 
seen in figure 3.8.   
3.5.2 City/town Market – lack of space
The urban market has, as shown in figure 3.8, a teledensity of around 34% as of June 
2006 (Lee, 2006). Delhi has a mobile teledensity of around 43% and a total teledensity 
(fixed and mobile) of 60% (Singh, 2006). The biggest problems the operators are facing 
in the bigger city areas as Delhi are a lack of space left to continue the build-out and 
increased prices of site estate. Also, more recently, esthetic and safety reasons have 
developed. To overcome these challenges operators are now trying to share towers in 
order to grow in cities. Around 20% of the towers are shared by two operators (Ericsson, 
2006). Usually when two operators decide to share a tower they agree on it on the 
premises that an “exchange” takes place. When an exchange takes place, two operators 
allow each other to use the others’ site to put up network facilities. Each operator still 
owns their own site and maintain it in usual manner, but allows the use of their site’s
passive infrastructure.  
3.6 Key Findings
The key findings of the chapter are highlighted below. 
 Wireless growth continues, but is expected to slow down over the next four years.
 India is a highly competitive and price sensitive market.
 Operators need to focus more on their core business to grow and keep up with 
demand. 
 The telecom sector is viewed as the single strongest factor to achieve economic 
growth.
 98% of the rural areas are still uncovered by mobile network. The primary reason 
for the slow growth rate in the regions is the higher cost per subscriber. 
 Urban markets are facing space problems and increasingly expensive site estate 
prices.
The key findings of this chapter will lay as a foundation for the continuing chapters, 
where the shared infrastructure concept and its opportunities will be discussed. 
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4. The Business Concept
The topic of focus in the coming chapter is the basic concept of the “telecom site leasing” 
business in the Indian market. The topic aims at laying a foundation for understanding 
the industry and why Ericsson wants to go into the business. A definition of the concept 
will firstly be given, followed by a discussion of the benefits, and why the concept has not 
been used in India before. Further discussions include the governmental initiative to start 
off the concept, some estimations of impact on goals and size of market, and finally a 
global market study.  
4.1 Definition of Concept
The concept of shared infrastructure in the telecom industry refers to, as the name 
suggests, two or more operators sharing network facilities (see figure 4.1). The concept 
has several variants, the four main ones presented below (Saran, P., Sridhar, V., 2005).
 The simplest form is the sharing of 
space on towers (+ shelters, diesel 
generators, and air-conditioning). 
Only the basic tower facilities are 
shared, meaning that separate 
networks for each operator still 
exists.
 Addition of antennae sharing, 
which is more complex due to 
technical issues.
 Addition of base station sharing. 
This is considered as active 
infrastructure sharing.
 Addition of core network sharing, 
which is also considered as active 
infrastructure sharing. 
The variant under development for implementation in India is the first. Note that different 
solutions of this variant also exist. 
Figure 4.2 shows an example of how a shared infrastructure site can look like. Sharable 
infrastructure in India includes (DoT, 2006):
 Land
 Tower
 Antennae
 Feeds
 Shelters
 Power Supply 
Figure 4.1.The basic “site sharing” business 
concept (adapted from Ranjalkar, 2006, p. 6). 
Operator A
Operator B
Independent
Infrastructure
    Shared Infrastructure
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 Other Network Elements (Diesel generator, battery back-up, air-conditioning 
facilities, cable tray, common earthing facilities, lightening arrangement/arrestors, 
security and access management, and battery bank)
Telecom network facilities are categorized as passive or active. The distinction is rather 
important as only passive infrastructure is presently allowed to be shared in India. Active 
infrastructure includes electronic equipment as the radio base station, while passive 
infrastructure includes all other parts (see list above), and are commonly referred to as 
“dead” or “non-thinking”. It is technically possible to share active infrastructure, but the 
Indian regulators have for now decided on not allowing it, as will be discussed later. 
Active infrastructure sharing is a common phenomenon in other markets. 
4.2 Why Shared Infrastructure?
It is predicted that sharing of passive infrastructure between multiple wireless service 
providers is a solution to almost all the major issues and challenges discussed in the 
previous chapter. The cost reductions incurred when sharing is predicted to lead to a 
faster development of wireless network coverage in the rural areas. The decreased need 
for towers will lead to a reduced space problem in the urban areas and improved 
esthetics. With a third party supplier of the service it is further believed that operators 
time to market will shorten, which in turn result in a faster growth of wireless services in 
India.   
All identified benefits12 for the wireless service providers, society, and consumers are
presented below.
                                                
12  Source is Gupta, 2006 if not otherwise stated.
Figure 4.2. One of the first Indian sites which have implemented the shared infrastructure concept.
Land
Tower and feeds
Antenna
Shelter
Power Supply
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Benefits for Telecom Operators13:
 Decreases operators CAPEX (Capital expenditures) and allows an enhancement 
of coverage and penetration.
 Reduces OPEX (operational expenditures) for operation and maintenance 
expenditures of passive infrastructure.
 Facilitates Telecom Operators to meet the mandated coverage requirements in low 
density areas such as rural and suburban.
 Reduce dropped calls (Ericsson, 2006).
 Saves time to market by the provision of an existing, telecom ready facility.
 Eliminate the need for Telecom Operators to manage non-core issues. Freeing of 
capital for core areas.
 Less administrative hassles (DoT,2006)
Benefits to the economy and society:
 Efficient use of capital in the economy.
 Reduce dropped calls (Ericsson, 2006).
 De-clutter skylines and safer city environment.
Benefits to the Consumers:
 Access to network all around country, since most likely not possible without 
sharing of infrastructure.
 Reduce dropped calls (Ericsson, 2006).
4.3 Why not Before and why not More?
The primary reason why sharing of passive infrastructure has not been done sooner is 
believed to be because no one has thought of it before (Sharma, 2006). The development 
of the wireless network has been argued to initially have been slowed down from the 
political atmosphere in the country, and therefore taken off relatively late. Much has 
happened at such a speed recently that the solution has not occurred to anyone until now.
The rivalry between the operators is another identified reason. The rivalry has made it 
difficult for cooperation between the operators on their own initiative. 
Many of the issues discussed in the previous chapter, such as lack of space and increased 
cost of land in urban areas, has not until recently been a problem. The need to share has 
as a result been insufficient in the past.
The price sensitive market has pushed tariff prices down to such an extent that operators 
now face a need to change their business model to increase the revenue per subscriber. 
Even now when all the benefits have been identified implementation of shared 
infrastructure between the wireless service providers is not taking off at anticipated 
speed. The reason is clearly believed to be the need for a third party supplier to provide 
the market with a finished solution. The need of such a supplier implies a creation of a 
                                                
13 Benefits in italic writing are only realized if there exists a third party supplier of the service. 
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whole new industry, much alike the one present in USA, Australia, and U.K. as will be 
discussed later. Some challenges of a “telecom site leasing” industry are presented below.
 Capital intensive, who take on the assets on their balance sheet?
 Financial funding difficulties to support the fast growth.
 Cost effective solutions to attract Telecom Operators.
 Sharing reluctance between operators. 
4.4 Governmental Push 
It lies in the government’s interest to increase teledensity across the country including the 
rural areas, as mentioned before. The government has therefore taken an initiative to start 
off a site leasing industry with a project called MOST. The idea of the Mobile Operators’ 
Shared Towers (MOST) project is to let a third party infrastructure provider set up sites, 
making them fully operational, and then lease them to several operators. In this way it is 
believed that both GSM and CDMA operators as private and public players, will be able 
to share infrastructure cost easier and to a wider extent than what is done presently. 
Four flagship sites included in the MOST project have at the present already been 
finished in the Delhi area. A total of ten pilot sites in Delhi have been planned to be build 
as a start of the MOST project. It has been agreed that for these particular sites a third 
party will set up and maintain the passive parts of the sites, while the operators will 
maintain their own equipment. The infrastructure that has been agreed to share is the 
entire above stated passive infrastructure list except the antennae, which could not be 
agreed to share. The four sites are presented below.   
 Delhi high court, two roof-top towers have been introduced in this location. The 
first tower is split between Airtel, Hutch, and IDEA. The second tower is split by 
MTNL, Reliance, and TATA. 
 Rajokri, one tower shared by Airtel, Hutch, IDEA, and TATA.
 Dhansa, one tower shared by Airtel, Hutch, IDEA, MTNL, Reliance, and TATA. 
The government joint with other interest groups, such as TRAI and COAI, are currently 
pushing the same concept to the rural areas. TRAI has with its universal service 
objectives, as explained in the previous chapter, set up a fund (the USO fund) for the 
purpose of providing these areas with network. According to the minister of 
telecommunication it is planned to build 8,000 – 10,000 shared sites, with funding from 
the USO fund, which would roughly cover 85% of these areas (Raj, 2006). The minister 
of telecommunication has also stated that a detailed study is undertaken to decide in 
which villages in the remote areas the USO fund will be of most assistance. These sites 
will be subject to bidding with regard to who the third party owner is going to be. The 
bidding of these future planned sites are divided into two parts, one including the passive 
infrastructure and the other including non-sharable active infrastructure as the radio base 
station. Only licensed access service providers will be eligible to bid for both parts (DoT, 
2006). The percentage the fund will cover of the site costs is not at the present decided 
on. It is expected that these sites are going to be ready for use in around 6-8 months 
(Sharma, 2006).  
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The MOST project is viewed as a first step toward deregulation of further shared 
infrastructure such as the active radio base stations (Sharma, 2006).  
4.5 Infrastructure Sharing’s Impact on Goals
Presently, there exist around 70,000 towers reaching 105 million subscribers. The 
governmental goal to the end of 2007 is a total of 200 million subscribers.  According to 
COAI 140,000 towers are needed to cover for that goal. By 2010 COAI estimates a 500 
million subscription base which would equal to 350,000 towers. The cost to build a 
tower, only including passive parts, in the Delhi area is around 129 kUSD (cost/tower = 
Rs 6 million), as of August 18th 2006 rate (Financial Express, 2006). According to 
various estimations it is expected that substantially less towers are going to be needed to 
cover for the future goals, with the infrastructure sharing concept. The estimations can be 
seen in figure 4.3 and 4.4 below (for more in detail calculations, see appendix I). 
The average shared tower will be more expensive than the average present operator-self-
owned towers due to the need for stronger and bigger sites. It is believed that the new 
sites will incur a 20% higher initial total cost (Ericsson, 2006). Assuming an average of 
2.514 operators per tower, the infrastructure cost reduction for every operator is estimated 
to 48%, not including after services cost reductions such as maintenance. The goal of 
reaching 500 million subscribers in 2010 and increased network penetration in the rural 
areas will thus be easier achieved.
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14 Average based on tower sharing market in US. 
Figure4.3.Cumulative 
number of new towers 
needed to cover for the 
predicted subscriber growth 
if passive infrastructure is 
shared vs. non-shared.   
28
Cumulated Cost/Operator of New Towers Shared vs. 
Non-shared Passive Infrastructure
0
10
20
30
40
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Non-shared
Shared
The minister of telecommunication, Mr Dayanidhi Maran, claims that operators can 
decrease their tower cost with 50% with the new concept (Financial Express, 2006). Note 
that this corresponds well to the above calculations of a 48% decrease. Other goals as
improving coverage, further reduction of tariffs for inhabitants with less buying power in 
the rural areas, and environmental and esthetic concerns are also expected to be fulfilled 
with the initiative from the MOST project (The Hindi Group, 2006). For these reasons, 
the government is now discussing with TRAI to look into the possibilities of a new 
policy, making sharing of infrastructure mandatory for operators (Techtree newsstaff, 
2006). 
4.6 Size of Market
If the Indian market would evolve toward the American market (see chapter 4.7.1) in 
terms of leasing revenues per tower it could reach an annual market size revenue of 2.2 
billion15 USD by 2008. In 2010 the size would be around 4.5 billion USD. Of course the 
Indian market is not identical to the American and the differences may imply different 
expectations in terms of estimations of the market size. If 20% less of the American 
average revenue per tower can be achieved in India, the market would still come to 
around 1.7 billion USD in 2008 and 3.6 billion USD in 2010 annually (see table 4.1 and 
4.2).   
                                                
15 The number is based on a calculated average from American Tower, Crown Castle, and SBA’s respective 
annual rental revenues per tower. The revenues and number of sites from the companies are extracted from 
their annual reports. The numbers only includes rental revenues and not site/network development services.   
Figure 4.4.Cumulative 
cost/operator of new towers 
needed to cover for the 
predicted subscriber growth 
if passive infrastructure is 
shared vs. non-shared.   
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2008 Indian Tower Market Estimations
Cumulative nbr. of new shared towers 2008 (thousands) 47.6
Average annual revenue/tower (USD in thousands) 45.7
Size of Indian annual tower market (USD in billions) 2.2
Cumulative nbr. of new shared towers 2008 (thousands) 47.6
Average annual revenue/tower (USD in thousands) 45.7
Expected revenue diff. in percentage 20%
Size of Indian annual tower market (USD in billions) 1.7
2010 Indian Tower Market Estimations
Cumulative nbr. of new shared towers 2010 (thousands) 98.0
Average annual revenue/tower (USD in thousands) 45.7
Size of Indian annual tower market (USD in billions) 4.5
Cumulative nbr. of new shared towers 2010 (thousands) 98.0
Average annual revenue/tower (USD in thousands) 45.7
Expected revenue diff. in percentage 20%
Size of Indian annual tower market (USD in billions) 3.6
4.7 Shared Infrastructure in Other International Markets
Presently many markets around the world have implemented various shared infrastructure 
solutions. The purpose of the study is to give a general picture of both mature and 
developing telecom markets. 
4.7.1 USA
In USA it is common for so called tower companies to rent out telecom sites. The basic 
business idea is to let operators lease space on sites of interest, where several other 
tenants can already be present, and earn a profit on the rent. Shared infrastructure most 
often includes the entire above stated passive infrastructure list, including the antennae 
more recently. The concept result in higher profits for the tower companies and reduced 
renting fees for the tenants the more tenants there are sharing a site. In this way, through 
a third party supplier, passive infrastructure sharing is common. The demand for such 
solutions is presently concentrated to urban areas, where the operators are in a need for 
higher network capacity. 
Note that, the presently second largest tower company in USA, Crown Castle, has an 
average of about 2.3 tenants per site. On 348 towers there are more than 5 tenants (Crown 
Castle, 2006). Not all tenants are telecom operators, some can e.g. be radio and TV 
Table 4.1. Annual revenue estimations of the 2008 Indian tower market, based on the American market.
Table 4.2. Annual revenue estimations of the 2010 Indian tower market, based on the American market.
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broadcasting companies. Still, number of tenants sharing the passive infrastructure as 
land and tower is highly achieved. 
Active infrastructure sharing is also present in the American market. Voicestream’s (now 
T-Mobile) agreement with Cingular to share complete infrastructure in New York, 
California, and Nevada, is one example (King, 2001). Furthermore, are Mobile Virtual 
Network Operators (MVNO’s), operators with (usually) no self-owned network 
infrastructure, active players in the market. Virgin Mobile USA, SmartServ, and Qwest 
are examples of such players. They most commonly lease network capacity from market 
leaders, SprintNextel being one supplier of such services (Charny, 2004).  
4.7.2 Australia
In Australia the sharing of infrastructure works in similar way as in US. There exist three 
major companies that own most sites, Crown Castle, Broadcast Australia, and Telstra. 
Crown Castle and Broadcast Australia (owned by Macquarie Bank) have their business 
focus on “telecom site leasing”, while Telstra is an operator with high network assets. 
Telstra is a partially stately owned operator and has as BSNL in India a wide coverage of 
their telecom network. They have, as BSNL, been reluctant to share their infrastructure, 
the reason being their belief that coverage gives higher return in terms of competitiveness 
than leasing revenues would (Lund, 2006). Crown Castle and Broadcast Australia, neither 
being a telecom operator, are on the other hand both trying to maximize their profit by 
including as many tenants as possible to their sites. Much of the passive parts of the 2G 
network have thus been shared in Australia on the initiative of a third party supplier.
The 3G network infrastructure has been shared to an even greater extent then the 2G. 
Australia is comparable to India in the sense that they also have large rural areas. To 
build out a 3G network in these areas alliances have been forced to be formed even 
including the sharing reluctant Telstra. Telstra and Hutch have formed one alliance while 
Vodafone Australia and Optus have formed theirs. 
In Australia the alliances do not mean that the operators share the assets incurred with an 
ownership of a site. Instead, other entities most often own sites and the alliances lease 
space. The difference of the 2G and the 3G infrastructure sharing is that in the 3G 
network both the passive and active infrastructure is shared, while in the 2G only the 
passive is shared. 
The MVNO phenomenon is also present in Australia, as it has been in US, with the 
market leader Virgin Mobile. In Australia Virgin Mobile lease capacity from Optus. 
4.7.3 Europe
The European market varies from country to country. Two EU markets have been chosen
to focus on, the Swedish and British. These have randomly been chosen, but with some 
consideration to the connections of India and/or Ericsson to these markets. England has 
had a strong influence over India historically which can still be seen in the market. It is 
therefore believed that it would be of interest to see how the British “site leasing” market 
has developed. As for Sweden the only reason for the choice of this country is because 
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Ericsson is a Swedish company and it therefore could be interesting to see how “site 
leasing” has evolved in the company’s home market. Sweden is also a country which 
represents another type of market than the previous presented ones. 
The one thing that all EU countries have in common is the imposed EU policies and 
regulations. The present status regarding infrastructure sharing (both passive and active) 
is that the European Commission has not found it to prevent competition. The EU 
commission has instead declared that it benefits consumers because of quicker roll outs 
of the network in less covered areas (EU Commission, 2003).  
4.7.3.1 Sweden
There is a great difference between the 2G and the 3G network in Sweden when it comes 
to infrastructure sharing. With regard to the 2G network very little sharing has been taken 
place. The operators have in general built their own networks and taken little advantage 
from each other. The only sharing that has been done is Telenor’s agreement with Telia 
to get access to Telia’s network in the northern parts of Sweden (Lund, 2006). Telenor 
has no own infrastructure in those parts.
The 3G network on the other hand has been crucial to share in order to realize a cost 
effective roll-out. Since it is allowed to share active infrastructure in Sweden, alliances 
between operators quickly arose at the time of the roll-out to share as much infrastructure 
as possible. Tele2 and Telia being one alliance and HI3G (partially owned by Hutch) and 
Europolitan Vodafone (now Telenor) forming the other. In this way, only two 3G 
networks needed to be built in Sweden. 
The only thing that the 2G and 3G infrastructure sharing has had in common is that no 
third party supplier has been present. All agreements have occurred between operators on 
their own initiative. Tower companies or alike does not at the present exist in Sweden.
4.7.3.2 U.K.
In United Kingdom sharing of infrastructure is also a widely used concept. A 
consequence of it being allowed to share active infrastructure, the world’s first MVNO 
operator, Virgin Mobile, entered the business here. Virgin Mobile doesn’t own any 
network facilities. Virgin has an agreement with T-mobile (formerly One-to-One) to lease 
capacity on its entire network (Ericsson, 2006). Another 2G partnership is the one 
between Hutch and O2, where Hutch wanted availability of a 2G network for its 
customers while rolling out its 3G network16.  
Furthermore, T-mobile and O2 has entered into an agreement to share 3G infrastructure in 
U.K. as well as in Germany. As in Sweden, it was crucial for the operators to share 3G 
infrastructure. The high licensing fees being the main catalyst behind this. Vodafone has 
an estimated 3G licensing cost of 1880 USD/subscriber (converted from 
£1000/subscriber, August 20th 2006 exchange rate) (Secker, 2001). 
                                                
16 Source is O2 annual report 2002.
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The tower business is present in U.K. as it is in US and Australia. The concept is the
same; multi operator solutions offered to operators for a lower price than if self-owned. 
As an example, it can be mentioned that one of U.K.’s biggest tower companies, Arqiva, 
has provided the market with so called CityCell solutions (Lund, 2006). On these sites, 
both 2G and 3G customers share infrastructure in what can be called a hotel. All the 
operators need to do is buy their active infrastructure, with Arqiva providing the passive 
infrastructure, the installations, and maintenance of the equipment (Arqiva press release, 
2006).  
4.7.4 Africa
Africa has experienced similar problems as India when it comes to infrastructure sharing. 
The lack of infrastructure sharing has in Africa, as in India, prevented more cost effective 
dispersion of telecom services. The non-sharing culture in Africa stem from three main 
reasons. Firstly, it is claimed that system specifications used are different and hence 
prevent sharing. Secondly, some operators have systems of inferior quality and of higher 
cost and thus are not willing to share this with other operators to maintain their 
competitive advantage. Thirdly, when a dominant or monopolistic player have been 
present and have established a wide network infrastructure they feel reluctant to share 
this with new entering competitors. Presently, it is not an uncommon sight to see three 
towers in a 200 meter radius from 3 different operators (CIPESA, 2006). The first and the 
second reason have been argued to be unqualified arguments and at the bottom line it all 
comes down to the rivalry culture between the competitors. Hence, the rivalry reason 
being the strongest for the operators not to join into alliances or partnership with each 
other. It is expected that more infrastructure sharing will take place as competition get 
increasingly fierce (Lund, 2006).   
Some similarities can be seen between Africa’s and India’s sharing problems. In India as 
in parts of Africa there has been an old monopoly operator who owns a wide network and 
is not willing to share due to competitive reasons. Also, the rivalry culture between the 
operators exists in both markets, resulting in slow development of networks in remote 
areas. Moreover, there have been arguments that in both markets the operators have 
simply not been too cost conscious.  
4.7.5 Global Study Findings
Some conclusions from these market examples will be discussed below. 
Just like alliances between airlines, telecom operator alliances have emerged around the 
globe. As the 3G network has been implemented in mature telecom markets it can be 
seen that alliances have formed between operators in order to overcome high 
infrastructure cost. In these markets active infrastructure has been allowed to share and 
thus the benefits even greater than the sharing of only passive infrastructure. Generally it 
can be summarized that these partnerships have been taken from the operators’ initiative. 
It can also be concluded that passive infrastructure sharing has normally been taken place 
with a third party player. The third party players in these markets have mostly been tower 
companies which lease space and infrastructure to multiple tenants on self owned or 
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leased sites. A market growth for such solutions has been expected globally. As a result, a 
market division between operators and other entities, as tower companies, which supply 
and maintain all network infrastructure is estimated (Lund, 2006).
A difference between developing and developed countries has also been distinguished. 
Less sharing is taking place in the less developed countries. The main reasons are 
concluded to be the lack of competition and rivalry between wireless service providers. A 
change is expected when competition increases and the need for faster and more cost 
efficient network roll-outs get crucial in order for a continuous market growth, as seen in 
India.
It has been claimed that regulations in the telecom network in India has been too strict 
resulting in prevention of faster development. An example of the tight regulations is the 
prohibition to share active infrastructure. If active infrastructure sharing would be 
allowed the consequences could mean a build-up of only one network in each telecom 
circle. The lengthy process of getting a license to build a network in a new circle would 
almost be eliminated and the infrastructure cost decreased heavily. Since presently only 
passive infrastructure is allowed to be shared, it is concluded that in order to overcome 
some of the cellular growth challenges, it is important to take advantage of the solution 
available in the market. The study of the various markets globally has revealed that the 
easiest way to implement passive infrastructure sharing on a larger scale is via a third 
party. The third party building, supervising, “owning”, and maintaining the site. 
The study has also raised concern regarding the belief that the “telecom site leasing” 
service will mean higher growth of network services in rural areas. Passive infrastructure 
sharing has mostly taken place in urban areas in countries like USA while active 
infrastructure has been more common in both rural and urban areas. A valid question to 
ask oneself is if the rural areas can hold to be profitable for operators even if the passive 
infrastructure is shared. 
4.8 Key Findings 
The key findings of the chapter are presented below.
 Only passive infrastructure is allowed to be shared in India.
 Benefits of sharing infrastructure include;
- Cost reductions
- Overcoming of urban space problems
- Improving esthetics with reduction of number of towers
 To overcome the challenge of operators’ lack of time a third party supplier is 
needed. The third party would provide the market with a leasing service of 
passive infrastructure to multiple tenants. Benefits of such a solution includes 
(except the already above stated ones);
- Eliminate the need for operators to manage non-core issues.
- Shortening operators’ time to market.
- Less administrative hassle.
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 Challenges exist, like the high financial requirements and sharing reluctance 
between operators, and need to be addressed and overcome to leverage the 
business on a wider scale.  
 The governmental initiated MOST project has been implemented in order to kick 
start the third party business to further improve mobile growth in the country.
 85% of the rural areas are expected to be covered with the help from 
governmental funding.
 Size of the infrastructure leasing market in 2010 is estimated to 3.6 billion USD 
annually.
 The sharing of infrastructure is common in many markets globally. Different 
solutions have developed depending on the market. Governmental regulations and 
the competitive landscape among operators is an important aspect for the concept 
to take off.  
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5. Ericsson – the Company Behind
To understand the reasons why Ericsson has shown interest to include the leasing service 
in their service portfolio, a presentation of the company behind the idea and its
expectations will be discussed in the following chapter. The chapter includes the growth 
of Ericsson India, Ericsson’s current service portfolio, the people, reasons why to include 
the service in the service portfolio, and the company expectations.
5.1 Total Growth of Ericsson India
Ericsson has been present in the Indian market for over a hundred years, the first business 
being made in 1903 with the sell of a manual switchboard to the Indian government 
(Ahluwaila, 2004). The experiences gained during the years have resulted in an 
advantageous platform to work from out of a competitive point of view. Ericsson is today 
a well known and respectable company in India. 
The growth of Ericsson India has increased steadily. As the industry of wireless 
infrastructure has grown so has Ericsson and its market share, with the exception from 
last year (see figure 5.1 below). Last years drop in revenue was due to an increased 
competition from other equipment vendors pushing in the segment, foremostly from 
Nokia. The drop is predicted to be temporal and that Ericsson instead will continue to 
grow in the wireless infrastructure service business (extracted from sources within 
Ericsson India). 
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The growth and the market leader position indicate a strong foothold in the country which 
is an advantageous position to leverage any new service or product from. The 
countrywide strong presence is thus one reason for the belief that Ericsson can 
successfully include the passive site leasing business in their service portfolio.   
Figure 5.1. Ericsson’s wireless service infrastructure growth in India, in terms of revenue and market 
share (data is extracted from Voice&Data).
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5.2 Offered Services17
Ericsson offers a wide range of products and services, some self-produced and some by 
third party suppliers. The services, which are the segment of interest with regard to the 
new “telecom site leasing” business, are divided into three main areas; managed services, 
integrated services, and advisory services. As the advisory service mostly include 
consulting and training, and therefore not connected to the business, it will not be further 
elaborated on. Furthermore, will only services within the two other fields, management 
and integrated services, which are related to the business be presented in short. The aim is 
to give a picture of the in-house knowledge of related services.
     
Ericsson Services relevant to the infrastructure leasing business
Managed Services Integrated Services
- Establish, operate, and transfer service - Civil works
- Field operations - Data migration
- Hardware support - Installation
- Managed operation - Integration
- O&M assistance - Optimization
- Software update management - Project management
- Solution management - Site acquisition
- System support - Site engineering
- Network design & consulting
    
5.2.1 Managed services
Managed services are a network operations service. The offering includes management of 
a customer’s complete network, which is, as mentioned, an appreciated service in 
emerging markets like India. Such a service includes a guarantee of quality of end user 
service by network planning, building, optimization, operation, maintenance and support.   
- Establish, operate, and transfer service – turn-key service; the overall responsibility 
of the operation of an operator’s network. The service is foremost aimed at operators 
who are facing major network expansions.
- Field operations – corrective and preventive maintenance network services. The 
service include maintenance of multi vendor networks and provision of active and 
passive spare parts.
- Hardware support – spare parts supplies and services.
- Managed operation – full responsibility of all network and service operation 
activities. The service consists of day-to-day operations, planning, design, and 
deployment services. 
- O&M assistance – operational expertise and support for carrying out day-to-day 
network operation tasks. 
                                                
17 All information below regarding offered services is extracted from Ericsson’s homepage with guidance 
from Ericsson employees.
Table 5.1. Ericsson’s offered services related to the infrastructure leasing business.
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- Software update management – supply of software updates to operators’ incumbent 
networks. 
- Solution management – customized solutions support for multi vendor components. 
Such solution support can be in the areas of service provisioning, revenue 
management, network management & service assurance, and service layer. 
- System support – assistance in operation, with everything from general consulting to 
the clearing of an emergency situation, including software updates on regular basis 
including bug fixes. 
5.2.2 Integrated Services
Integrated services support customers by designing, implementing and integrating 
networks and systems in multi-vendor environments. The services range from 
implementation of new networks to upgrading and migrating existing networks. The 
service assures customers that their networks can support the latest applications and that 
systems such as billing and customer care perform as a fully integrated part of the 
network. 
- Civil works – design and construction of network sites. This service is only offered 
together with complete network solutions. It is leveraged through third party 
contractors, consultants, and suppliers. It is furthermore a service which is very much 
dependant on local factors. 
- Installation – installation of various kinds of equipment, from nodes to complete 
system solutions. It is applicable for all network elements either new, upgrade, or 
change-outs. 
- Integration – integration of network roll-out with existing technical environment, 
communication standards, end-user services such as integrating network systems 
from multiple vendors, and nodes and terminals from various vendors with 
technologies18 as TDMA, CDMA, GSM, GPRS, and WCDMA.
- Optimization – optimization of multi-vendor as well as single user network, including 
adaptations needed for the network elements to secure high quality in network 
functions and end-user services. 
- Project management – planning, organizing, manage quality & risks, monitoring, and 
controlling the different phases throughout the entire project. 
- Site acquisition – identifying, evaluating, and procuring sites. As with civil works, 
site acquisition is country specific and dependent on local factors, such as the real 
estate market, land and property owner, local building regulations, and environmental 
regulations. The service is offered through third party suppliers and is not offered 
alone but included in a service package of total network build solutions with mainly 
Ericsson products. 
- Site engineering – provides plans and documentation and construction designs for the 
site taking the equipment to be used at the site into account. The service is available 
for new, upgrade or change-out installations, and applies to everything from simple 
nodes to complete system solutions. The service results in instruction and 
documentation for installing all associated equipment, including antennae, base 
                                                
18 See appendix I for technology definitions.
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stations, access cabinets, switches, routers, transmission and backbone equipment, 
cabling, and connections. The service is provided from third party suppliers. 
- Network design & consulting – network design and consulting services to reach 
coverage expectations. 
5.2.3 Conclusion
It can be seen from the above presentation that Ericsson offers many services globally, 
either through third parties or own, to build and manage all parts of a network, including 
the passive infrastructure. It can therefore be concluded that Ericsson has the channels 
and the knowledge to support a “site leasing” business. Even though no direct knowledge 
exists of how a leasing business is run, the existing wide expanding related knowledge is 
enough to qualify as yet another reason for an interest in the new service.  
5.3 The People
Without the right team behind a business idea it will have no chance of success (Sahlman, 
1997). The need of support and force to push for an idea is vital in any business in any 
market. 
Within Ericsson there has traditionally been a rivalry between the product selling unit and 
service selling unit. The focus of the salesmen has globally been on the products, which 
have higher margins and has in general been easier to sell. The service unit has also been 
viewed as non-core activities for long. The growth of the company in developing markets 
has started to change this view. An insight of the importance of the services in order to 
expand and provide value added services to beat competition has been established. It was 
clear from the company’s latest quarterly report that the company expects the service area 
to grow faster than the products during next year (Augustsson, 2006). Some of the old 
reluctance toward the service unit still exists.
Ericsson India has a relatively large service unit to support the market demand. In that 
respect the backing of a new “site leasing” service is estimated to get higher support than 
it probably would in some other markets. The Indian office is furthermore known to hold 
a dedicated team which will stand behind management decisions. Some of the above 
issues still apply for the salesmen in India though. It is viewed to be crucial to get the 
backing from the salesmen, without any push from them few solutions will be sold. In 
order to overcome such a scenario it is expected that management need to influence and 
make clear of the importance and opportunities of the concept. Since the idea has some 
management support, which may be viewed as a stronger incentive in India than in some 
other markets, challenges will be easier to overcome. It is commonly said that, when 
entering a new business; business model, brand strength, industry structure, and 
competitive intensity, can all prove less valuable without the support and ability of the 
leading organization. 
5.4 Why Include in Ericsson Business?
One might find that entering a new business which is in some ways not core to Ericsson 
is a risky business. The option of not going may, on the other hand, be more risky. It has 
39
also been argued that the business is very close to Ericsson’s core services, and could 
therefore become a core activity in the future. As most of the knowledge is already in-
house the growth in this new direction can be viewed as a natural step. If the revenues 
can prove to match the American market substantial profits can be earned. If being on the
optimistic side, assuming that a 20% market share can be reached, an annual leasing 
revenue of USD 720 million19 could be reached by 2010 for Ericsson alone. Since 
basically no one is competing in the market at the present the opportunities are expected 
to exceed the risks (also see chapter 6.3.3 discussion).    
5.5 Expectations 
The expectation of the idea is a new business opportunity. The highlights are presented 
below; 
- Increased overall revenue.
- Better integration with customers.
- Better utilization of Ericsson’s existing economies of scale.
- Meet a new market demand with minimal effort since most knowledge is 
already in-house.
- Provide the market with a value added service to beat competition in other 
fields as well. 
5.6 Key Findings
- Ericsson India’s service segment is growing and is seen as increasingly 
important. 
- Ericsson has a lot of related knowledge in-house to leverage a “site leasing”
business.
- The general reluctance to push for selling Ericsson services compared to their 
high margin products among the salesmen is concluded to be a challenge 
which needs to be addressed in order to succeed with the tower industry entry 
in India.
- The “site leasing” business is relatively close to Ericsson’s core activities and 
could be seen as a natural industry to grow into.
                                                
19 Estimations are based on data explained in chapter 4.6. 
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Table 6.1. Expected sharing density.
6. Analysis
In previous chapters it has been shown that the concept is favorable in a regulatory and 
macro economic perspective. A presentation of the company behind the idea has also 
been added to better understand the Ericsson perspective. The purpose of the coming 
chapter is to analyze whether the service is profitable and favorable in a micro economic 
perspective. It also aims at visualizing a picture of the industry, analyzing internal 
factors, like strengths and weaknesses of Ericsson, and risks of the business. These 
analyses are essential for answering the main purpose of the thesis; how to best enter the 
“telecom site leasing” business. 
6.1 Investment Analysis20
The analysis has been done with the assumption that 15,000 new towers will be build by 
Ericsson for the purpose of sharing. The model is based on that no towers will be built 
until an anchor tenant has signed up, there will therefore never be less than one tenant per 
site. The sharing density is presented in the table below. 
                                                
20 Only the result of the analysis will be presented due to the sensitiveness of some of the numbers 
included.
Sharing density
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4
Anchor
100% of first year
new towers.
100% of second 
year new towers.
etc. etc.
75% of year 2 new 
towers.
+8% of year 1 new 
towers.
75% of year 3 new 
towers.
+8% of year 2 new 
towers.
Tenant 2 0
75% of first year 
new towers. = 83% of year 1 
towers.
+75% of year 2 
towers.
= 83% of year 1 
towers.
+83% of year 2 
towers.
+75% of year 3 
towers
33.33% of above 
two tenants towers.
33.33% of above 
year 3 two tenants 
towers.
+45.67% of 
previous year two 
tenants towers.
33.33% of above 
year 4 two tenants 
towers.
+45.67% of 
previous year 3 two 
tenants towers.
Tenant 3 0
= 25% of year 1 
towers.
= 51% of year 1 
towers.
+25% of year 2 
towers.
= 51% of year 1 
towers.
+51% of year 2 
towers.
+25% of year 3 
towers.
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These assumptions will be looked into more in the sensitivity analysis. To limit the 
analysis the possibility to acquire existing towers from operators is not taken into 
account. 
The result of the analysis is showed in figure 6.1 and 6.2. As expected, the high initial 
investments incur a cumulated negative profit the first years to turn into a positive profit 
later. In figure 6.1 below it can be seen that the cumulated profit is turned to positive in 
the beginning of year 5.
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To further analyze the profitability of the business, a net present value (NPV), pay back 
(PB), and internal rate of return (IRR) calculations have been performed. The length of 
Figure 6.1. Estimated profit potential if 15,000 towers are built and leased.
Figure 6.2. Estimated cumulative free cash flow if 15,000 towers are built and leased.
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the project has been estimated to ten years. The estimation is based on American Tower’s 
Brazil and Mexico operations, where tenants have an initial leasing term of ten years21. 
The calculations yielded a NPV of 237 million USD, PB period of 5.3 years, and an IRR 
of 17.6%. Since all projects with a positive NPV should be undertaken, it can be 
concluded that Ericsson should enter the business. A pay back period of 5.3 years is 
further considered as a relative acceptable time for such an investment to recover from its 
initial costs. The later can be argued about, some may think that 5.3 years is too long and 
therefore affecting Ericsson India’s overall performance numbers negatively initially. It is 
easy to say that one should rather look at the long term prosperity of the investment, but 
in order to please stockholders and alike the short term perspective is an important factor 
to take into account. The IRR of 17.6%, compared to the interest rate of 10%, further 
support an entrance of the business.
It can be concluded from the capital budgeting methods; NPV, PB period, and IRR,
presented above, that Ericsson should enter the business. However, one should be aware 
of the rather long term of negative margin.
6.1.1 Sensitivity analysis 
Future estimations are always a bit uncertain especially when entering a new business. It 
is therefore sensible to do a sensitivity analysis, to see how the profitability of the 
business changes with changing parameters. Three parameters have been chosen; 
expected rental revenues, number of built towers, and amount of tenants per site. Separate 
results for changes in each parameter will be presented, followed by an analysis 
presenting the worst case scenario and best case scenario.  
Analysis one – 20% less three tenant sites than expected are achieved. 
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21 Source: American Tower’s annual report
Figure 6.3. Estimated profit potential if 20% fewer three tenants sites is realized.
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Cumulative free cash flow
-1000
-500
0
500
1000
1500
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Year
m
ill
io
n
 U
S
D
NPV = 226 million USD
PB period = 5.6 years
IRR = 16.4%
Analysis two – 5000 more towers are decided to be built in year 2009.
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Figure 6.5. Estimated profit potential if 20,000 towers are built and leased.
Figure 6.4. Estimated cumulative free cash flow if 20% fewer three tenants sites is realized.
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Cumulative free cash flow
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Analysis three – Rental revenues received are 20% lower than expected. 
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Figure 6.7. Estimated profit potential if 20% lower rental revenues than expected are realized.
Figure 6.6. Estimated cumulative free cash flow if 20,000 towers are built and leased.
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Analysis four – worst case scenario; 20% decreased rental revenues, 15.000 towers built, 
and 20% fewer three tenants sites.
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Figure 6.9. Estimated profit potential for a worst case scenario.
Figure 6.8. Estimated cumulative free cash flow if 20% lower rental revenues than expected are realized.
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Analysis five – best case scenario; 20% higher rental revenues due to market demand and 
reduced amount of competitors, 20.000 towers built and leased, and 20% more three 
tenant sites.
Calculated Profit Potential
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Figure 6.11. Estimated profit potential for a best case scenario (note that the left y-axes scale has been 
changed).
Figure 6.10. Estimated cumulative free cash flow for a worst case scenario.
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From the sensitivity analysis it can be concluded that the project is profitable in all of the 
above scenarios except in the worst case scenario. The worst case scenario indicates some 
of the risks with the investment, which will be further discussed in chapter 6.3.1.
6.2 Market Analyses
6.2.1 Competitors22
It is not yet clear how the Indian market for shared infrastructure will evolve. Is it going 
to resemble the American model, where the operators have “outsourced” the passive 
infrastructure sharing to tower companies? Or, are the Indian operators instead going to 
turn to infrastructure service providers for management of the leasing service? Or, is it 
going to evolve its own model where the operators will go to a one-stop supplier of both 
passive and active infrastructure, these suppliers being the major equipment vendors? Or, 
will it be a mix of all above scenarios?
Ericsson will have competitors in the infrastructure sharing business and it is clear that 
that they need to be identified to be beaten. The question is which type of provider will 
hold the strongest threat. An analysis has been performed with the aim to give a general 
picture of possible competitor groups. 
6.2.1.1 Tower Companies
Tower companies, with their core competence in the telecom infrastructure leasing field, 
are expected to be the number one threat to Ericsson in this particular business. The 
possibility of the entrance of big international players as American Tower, Crown Castle, 
and SBA Communication is a known threat (Ericsson, 2006).   
                                                
22 For a more detailed summary of current possible competitors in India, see appendix II. 
Figure 6.12. Estimated cumulative free cash flow for a best case scenario.
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6.2.1.2 Infrastructure Providers
Infrastructure providers, with their core competence, as the name suggest, in providing 
infrastructure in order to build a site, are estimated to be the number two threat to 
Ericsson (Ericsson, 2006). Information on local providers’ websites show that the 
business is of interest to them and that some have already started the entrance. 
Experience from the US market show that site development companies can grow to 
become a tower company. SBA Communication is one example of such a company. They 
started out as a site development company and are now one of USA’s top tower 
companies.
6.2.1.3 Equipment Vendors
No information can be found on respective vendors’ website if they are planning to join 
the business. It is believed that these will not try to enter the “site leasing” business
initially (Ericsson, 2006). A possibility is that they might want to wait and see the 
outcome of how the market takes shape and then join through partnerships. Another 
possibility is that some is not interested at all of an entrance. In any case, it is estimated 
that if they do not enter now, the barriers will rise and result in difficulties for late 
arrivals. Meaning that, even if the business develops to an advantageous business, these 
late arrivals will face higher hindrances when trying to enter later. As a consequence, 
equipment vendors will not in the short term be the toughest competitors and will 
probably not enter easily in the long term, thus in general posing a smaller threat.
6.2.1.4 Expected Density of Competitors
The “site leasing” service is presently in between the development and introduction stage 
of the “product” life 
cycle (see figure 6.7
below). If the service 
takes off it will attract 
players as the sales 
increase. The growth 
stage will be the time 
where most players will 
be active in the fight 
for a market share. The 
growth stage is 
however expected to be 
rather short because of 
the high entry barriers
(Ericsson, 2006). The 
players with the best 
competitive forces will 
survive while many
will have to drop off. After the market settles down and enter the maturity stage it is 
expected that the industry will consist of a few big players. This expectation is based on 
the requirement of high financial resources to cover for India’s immense mobile 
subscriber growth and the requirement of a quick and wide expanding roll-out. Another 
Figure 6.13. The current stage of the “site leasing” service in India 
applied to the product life cycle.
The “telecom site leasing” 
service
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reason is the belief that the operators will not be willing to, due to time limitations, 
manage many different suppliers of the service.
6.2.2 Barriers of Entry
When entering a new business, as when entering a new market, six major entry barriers 
exist; economies of scale, brand identification, capital requirement, cost disadvantages 
independent of size, access to distribution, and government policy (Porter, 1979). These 
will be discussed and presented below.
Economies of scale - The economies of scale barrier determine entry by forcing the 
aspirant either to come in on a large scale or to accept a cost disadvantage. The barrier is 
estimated to be relatively high when entering the “site leasing” industry in India. In order 
to compete in the price sensitive market in the telecom service and or product segment,
economies of scale is needed. Ericsson has the advantage of scale, which is why the 
barrier will give Ericsson some lead compared to many potential competitors. 
Brand identification – Brand identification creates a barrier by forcing entrants to spend 
heavily to overcome customer loyalty. Ericsson is a well known brand throughout India 
and is regarded as a high quality service and product provider. The Ericsson brand is not, 
on the other hand, connected to the tower industry which may imply a barrier. It is 
estimated that the brand is strong enough to give Ericsson an advantage compared to 
smaller new players and local infrastructure providers with limited size. Compared to the 
well established international tower companies, Ericsson will face a relatively high brand 
identification barrier. 
Capital requirement – The need to invest large financial resources in order to compete 
creates an entry barrier. This barrier will be high in the Indian tower industry. High 
financial resources are needed to leverage the business on a large scale, to handle the cost 
incurred with owning sites, and to cope with project management expenditures. Ericsson
has an advantageous position in this aspect, since its financial resources exceeds many 
competitors and has capital available for new market establishments. Compared to some 
players can Ericsson’s reluctance to take on the assets on their balance sheet, on the other 
hand, prove to be a barrier since financial partners may be needed. 
Cost disadvantages independent of size – incumbent companies may have cost 
advantages not available to potential rivals, no matter what their size and attainable 
economies of scale. These advantages can e.g. stem from the effects of the learning curve 
(and the experience curve) and proprietary technology solutions. A cost disadvantage 
barrier can be distinguished connected to the learning curve in the Indian tower industry. 
Ericsson will most likely face such a disadvantage when entering compared to tower 
companies. The same types of companies are, on the other hand, going to face cost 
disadvantages in knowledge and experience of the Indian market. Ericsson has clear cost 
advantages with their long history of service management contracts and strong buying 
power in the country. Compared to local infrastructure providers both equipment vendors 
and tower companies may face cost disadvantages due to their infrastructure and market 
knowledge. Infrastructure providers is estimated to be able to compete with a lower cost 
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solution since they are the first hand supplier. Infrastructure providers will face cost 
disadvantages in other areas such as management of site leasing and lack of 
understanding and knowledge of the broader telecom picture.
Access to distribution channels – An entrant in any market or business must secure 
distribution of its services. As Ericsson already has access to a wide distribution network 
throughout India this barrier is expected to be an advantage to Ericsson. Most of the local 
players do not have equal width of their network and outside players will need to create a 
complete new network of distribution, hence facing a high barrier. 
Government policy – The government can limit or even foreclose entry to industries with 
such controls as license requirements. The government can also play a major indirect role 
by affecting entry barriers through institutional voids as lack of infrastructure (Khanna 
and Palepu, 2006). Even though the government in general tries to encourage the 
business with for example their USO fund some barriers still exist working against 
entering players. Government regulations on foreign entering firms are an example of a 
barrier which will affect the international tower companies and other international players 
interested in entering the market. Another barrier is the slow general infrastructure 
development, which, due to the bureaucracy environment and lack of organization of the 
ministry and government, increases cost for all entering players. It can be argued that 
Western entering companies, as the major tower companies, will be less equipped to deal 
with such difficulties. 
6.2.2.1 Barriers Conclusion
Table 6.2 below summarizes the barriers affect on Ericsson. It can clearly be seen that 
Ericsson hold a leading advantage over the infrastructure providers, but will as predicted 
face barriers compared to the larger international tower companies.   
51
Table 6.2. A summary of Porter’s barriers of entry applied to Ericsson. 
Barriers Pro and Against Ericsson
Barriers
Pro 
Ericsson
compared 
to 
all
Pro 
Ericsson
compared 
to infra. 
providers
Pro
Ericsson 
compared 
to tower 
COs
Against 
Ericsson 
compared 
to infra. 
providers
Against 
Ericsson 
compared 
to tower 
COs
Pro and 
against
all
Economies of 
scale √
Brand 
identification √ √
Capital 
requirement √ √
Cost 
disadvantages 
independent of 
size
√ √ √ √
Access to 
distribution 
channels
√
Government 
policy √
6.2.3 Five Forces
The second market analysis tool which will be applied to the case is the five forces 
model. According to Porter, an industry is influenced by five forces (see figure 6.14
below). The model will be used to better understand the “site leasing” industry in which 
Ericsson will compete in. In the fight for market share in the new business, competition 
will not only be held by other competitors. Customers, suppliers, potential entrants, and 
substitute solutions are all competitive factors that need to be identified. The weaker the 
threat are collectively, the greater the opportunity for superior performance (Porter, 
1979). The goal of the analysis is to find a position where Ericsson best can defend itself 
against these forces or can influence them in its favor. 
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Force 1: Industry Rivalry
Industry rivalry is normally measured by how high the concentration of the market share 
is divided among the four largest firms. A low concentration ratio indicates that the 
industry is characterized by many rivals, no one of which have a significant market share. 
Such a market is more competitive. A high concentration ratio is, on the other hand, an 
industry with few rivals with large portions of the market share. The Indian market can 
go either way, but it is estimated that it is more likely to go for a high concentration ratio 
(see above discussion, chapter 6.2.1.4). Around ten providers is a rough guess of the 
industry concentration after the sifting. In pursuing an advantage over rivals, a firm can 
choose from several competitive moves; changing prices (raising or lowering prices to 
gain a temporary advantage), improving product differentiation, creatively using channels 
of distribution, and exploiting relationships with suppliers (Yip, 1982).  
Force 2: Threat of substitute services
The threat of substitute services is expected to be low in the near future, but in the longer 
perspective a threat of a substitute service may arise with the expected deregulation of 
active infrastructure sharing policies. Active sharing services would under normal 
circumstances imply alliances between operators and thus a consolidation of the market, 
resulting in deceased revenue for “passive site leasing” companies. In most western 
markets, were active sharing and “site leasing” services co-exists, this is a known threat 
and has been stated as a factor which needs attention23.  
Force 3: Bargaining power of customers
The bargaining power of the customers is expected to be relatively high. There exist few 
buyers with significant market share (BSNL, Bharti, Hutch, IDEA, TATA, and Reliance) 
indicating high bargaining power, but since the service is expected to be sold to other 
industries like TV and radio broadcasting it will be lessened. 
                                                
23 Source is American Tower and Crown Castle Annual Reports, 2005. 
Industry
rivalry
Bargaining 
power of 
customers
Bargaining 
power of 
suppliers
Threats of 
substitute 
products
Threats of 
new 
entrants
Figure 6.14. The industry’s five forces (Porter, 1979)
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Force 4: Threat of new entrants
The threat of new entrants is expected to be present and most threatening in the 
introduction and growth stage of the service. As described above, it is believed that 
competition will get increasingly fierce as the service grows in sales, but that the number 
of providers will decrease as the market matures. The highest entrant threat is concluded 
from above analysis to come from foreign tower companies. 
Force 5: Bargaining power of suppliers
The suppliers’ power will be low. The suppliers to Ericsson in India in this particular 
service will not differ from the ordinary operations. The suppliers, in other words, will be 
infrastructure providers which build the sites and some equipment suppliers which 
provide the sites with equipment as antennae and feeds. As these will not differ from the 
normal operations, the bargaining power of suppliers is not an important force to watch 
out for in the “telecom site leasing” business. 
6.2.3.1 Five Forces Conclusion
Figure 6.15 below summarizes the forces identified above. The analysis goal was to find 
a position where Ericsson best can defend itself against these forces.
                            
The analysis relieved that the market will have a high concentration ratio, with rather few 
but strong competitors. These competitors are expected to foremostly come from the 
American tower industry. Since the bargaining power of the customers will furthermore 
be rather high it is advisable that Ericsson should create a financially strong unit through 
aggressive initial investments. A start entry, which will be discussed more in the next 
chapter, is bidding for the USO funded sites. Through such investments Ericsson will 
create higher entry barriers for new entrants, as higher capital requirements, economies of 
scale, brand recognition, and access to distribution channels. The higher barriers will
Industry rivalry
→
High market 
concentration ratio
Bargaining power
of customers
→ 
Relatively high
Bargaining power
of suppliers
→
Relatively low
Threats of new entrants
→
High in growth face.
Tower COs the biggest threat
Threats of substitute 
products/services
→
Active infrastructure sharing
Roaming
Figure 6.15. Summary of five forces analysis
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result in fewer competitors and stronger bargaining power for the service providers. 
Ericsson is thus creating a more profitable market through decreasing customer power
and the threat of new entrants, while achieving a more consolidated industry. In pursuing 
an advantage over the fewer but stronger competitors it is advised that Ericsson should 
differentiate its service offering. This strategy will be discussed more into detail in the 
next chapter. 
When it comes to the treat of substitute services, the expected future deregulation of the 
active infrastructure sharing policy can’t be prevented. If a scenario of increased alliances 
between operators, increased roaming, and entry of MVNOs will realize, thus decreasing 
the demand for a “passive site leasing” service between multiple tenants, Ericsson is 
estimated to have several possibilities. Since Ericsson has its historical core knowledge in 
active infrastructure, it is expected that Ericsson can shift scope of business relatively 
easy. The already present shared towers would still be of used, but instead of leasing out 
passive infrastructure only, Ericsson could now lease active services to operators as well 
(Ericsson, 2006). Ericsson would, in other words, supply the operators with the 
possibility to lease both active and passive equipment, much like the services to MVNOs 
supplied by other wireless service providers today. This new business is estimated to 
bring increased revenues compared to just leasing passive infrastructure. 
6.2.4 SWOT analysis
Another well known analysis tool is the SWOT model. The purpose of its use here is to 
further explore how to best enter the business in an Ericsson perspective. The model is 
useful in order to realize and understand both the strengths and opportunities, but also the 
weaknesses and threats to form a final strategy. 
6.2.4.1 Strengths
Ericsson holds a relatively large portfolio of strengths related to the leasing service. Its 
strongest is viewed to be its unique selling point of being able to deliver a total solution 
to its customers, including everything from the leasing service to installations, updates, 
products, and O&M services of both passive and active parts. The leasing service, 
included in a one-stop-shop package, would thus be a value added service to Ericsson’s 
customers. Compared to potential competitors Ericsson has strengths like cultural 
knowledge, present customer base, access to well working distribution system and 
suppliers, estimated superior service performance in O&M and network management, 
and high quality reputation among customers in relating fields. 
6.2.4.2 Weaknesses
The most apparent weakness is the lack of experience in the tower industry. Tower 
companies, which have several years of experience of leasing out passive infrastructure 
to operators, can follow a known formula and adapt it to the market. Ericsson may have 
more difficulties when leveraging the business and thus be a few steps behind. Another 
weakness that Ericsson holds compared to some of its competitors, when only looking at 
the passive sharing solutions, is an estimated higher cost solution. The estimation is based 
on the lack of experience in pricing of the service and the business in general. Tower 
companies will probably be able to reduce cost and possibly offer a lower priced solution 
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due to a more effectively run business. A further cost disadvantage is expected if a 
financial partner is needed, which incline higher costs and thus will push the price up or 
the margin down. Moreover, internal challenges as the above discussed support from 
local management and salesmen can prove to be a weakness that needs further attention.
6.2.4.3 Opportunities
“If it was easy to predict what people will buy, there wouldn’t be any opportunities” 
(Sahlman, 1997). Of course, as argued before, it is hard to predict if operators actually 
will buy the service. But by identifying opportunities with the service one can get a 
picture of if the benefits are worth the risks. 
There exists a clear macro economic need, identified in chapter 3 and 4, of a “site 
leasing” service. There also exists a micro economic need for the operators to reduce 
their costs in order to increase their ARPU. As discussed before, a “site leasing” service 
could meet both these needs. It is hence hard to argue that the concept in India is not 
altogether a new business opportunity.
Companies need to adapt to local needs. The “site leasing” service is clearly, as seen in 
the paragraph above, in-line with such needs. Compared to other equipment vendors
Ericsson has thus with this service an opportunity to provide their customers with an
added value service, strategically offered to satisfy the local Indian market. The increased 
competition in the wireless infrastructure service segment, as seen in chapter 5.1, is a
further argument of the importance to differentiate oneself to create competitive 
advantage. 
Identifying the right growth strategy is critical to build a world-class business (Khanna 
and Palepu, 2006). It is believed that if the service takes off in India, Ericsson could 
leverage the business elsewhere where similar needs exist. The service does thus hold 
growth opportunities, both global and domestic.   
As the tower industry is expected to take off with or without Ericsson, Ericsson should be 
aware of the opportunity of it, most likely, being the only company interested in joining 
the business which would have the competence of all parts of a telecom network. As also 
mentioned as an Ericsson strength, the capability of Ericsson to be the sole provider of a 
complete end-to-end solution, including management of all parts of a customer’s 
network, is also identified as an opportunity. Such an opportunity usually means a 
possibility of higher service revenues compared to industry competitors.  
6.2.4.4 Threats
Threats are always present when entering a new market or business. The biggest threat 
for Ericsson when entering the industry is estimated stronger competitive abilities of 
potential entering tower companies. These will most likely, as mentioned, be able to 
deliver a more cost effective solution than Ericsson due to their experience in the field. 
Another threat which could terminate the opportunities of the business is the market 
demand. As argued in chapter 4, reluctance to share between operators in India can prove 
to be a difficult obstacle to overcome. Finally, as identified in the five forces analysis, the 
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threat of industry consolidation as a result of future allowance of active sharing is a threat 
in the long term that will most likely end in the need for Ericsson to reinvent the service. 
All of these threats are estimated to have the ability of turn the cash flow of the service to 
negative numbers. 
6.2.4.5 SWOT conclusion
A summary of the findings of the SWOT analysis is presented in figure 6.16 below. 
Strengths
- Superior service performance compared to 
competitors in O&M, installations, 
management etc. 
- Existing customer relationships
- Unique selling point – one stop shop for 
management of total network to a reduced 
cost than before.
- Knowledge of market and business culture.
- Access to a well established distribution 
system and local suppliers.
- High quality reputation in relating fields.
Weaknesses
- Price – Ericsson’s lack of ability to deliver 
as cost effective solutions as Tower Cos.
- People – smaller part of Ericsson’s overall 
business, therefore not as much focus as 
potential competitors.
- Communication internally and externally.
- Brand recognition in the leasing service 
field.
Opportunities
- Macro and micro economic need.
- Added value to customer.
- Competitive advantage over existing 
equipment vendors. 
- Domestic and international growth 
opportunities.
- Possibility of being a sole provider of an 
end-to-end network service.
Threats
- Tower Cos strong competitive abilities.
- Affect on existing customer relations if 
business not successful.
- Market demand. Overcome operators’ 
reluctance to share and change.
- Industry consolidation.
6.3 Risk Analysis
Growth always involves taking risks. A firm needs to assess the risks and potential 
outcomes to face and minimize them. One should keep in mind that a risk can be turned 
into an opportunity (Slywotzky and Drzik, 2005).
6.3.1 Financial Risk24
From the findings in the previous chapters and from the sensitivity analysis, financial 
risks for Ericsson when entering the business have been distinguished. Four main 
financial risk scenarios which have been identified as entering risks will be discussed 
below. 
The first identified risk is the risk of not overcoming the challenge of the local sharing 
reluctance between the operators. This can result in Ericsson not being able to bring 
                                                
24 The financial risk analysis is based on sources from Ericsson India and annual reports from the tower 
industry.
Figure 6.16. Summary of SWOT analysis
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much more than one tenant to a site (Ericsson, 2006). Since the price model used in the 
industry is based on an assumption that on average there will be more than one tenant per 
site, such a scenario will result in substantial losses. A tendency of such results could be 
seen in the sensitivity analysis (see analysis 1, chapter 6.1.1), where a 20% decrease of 
third tenant customers lead to 18% lower NPV. The scenario of only achieving one tenant 
per site would result in the disastrous NPV of -641 million USD. Even if the likeliness of 
only attracting one tenant to each site is small, one should note that the number of tenant 
variable is important for the profitability of the business.  
The risk of affecting presently good customer relations negatively if the service does not 
meet industry expectations is another scenario which has been identified as a potential 
risk not only to the business but to Ericsson India as a company. Such a risk could 
decrease Ericsson’s market share and revenues in the overall Indian business. 
The third risk is the risk of not achieving expected rental revenues. The rental revenues, 
as seen in the sensitivity analysis (see analysis 3, chapter 6.1.1), are also an important 
variable for a successful business. The Indian market is very price sensitive and it is 
possible that Ericsson’s “telecom site leasing” business will be forced to push prices 
down below expected levels. A 20% decrease in expected rental revenues would result in 
an 83% decrease of the NPV. The revenues are therefore a variable of importance to 
monitor.
The last of the four main identified risks is the risk of hidden costs. Costs not included in 
the investment analysis, have the capability of turning the investment to a non-profitable 
one. 
Other identified long term risks include; mergers among wireless providers implying 
consolidation of the industry, engagement of roaming between wireless providers as an 
alternative to sharing, and too long return of investment even if the net present value is 
positive.
6.3.2 Going Alone vs. Partner risks 
Knowledge and funding from an outside partner is a solution to overcome some of the 
challenges when entering the business. A possibility is to join a more into depth 
partnership like a joint venture. An entrance to such a partnership is usually time 
consuming and difficult depending on the partner. Important aspects to take into account 
when planning for a joint venture is the purpose of the venture, common goals, and 
organizational similarities (Linde, 2006). It is estimated that neither of the identified 
possible partner groups can fulfill all of these requirements. The lack of similarity 
between the organizations is the biggest threat in this case for an unsuccessful venture. It 
is therefore concluded that Ericsson should more look into the possibility to get funding 
and maybe also knowledge from a “partnership” with looser strings attached. The 
identified risks of the different partner solutions are given below.
- Going alone – no alliance with any major entity. Ericsson takes the assets 
incurred with owning sites on their balance sheet and hire local contractors 
etc. as usual when delivering site solutions to customers.
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 Risks – slower time to market, assets on balance sheet, and lack of 
experience in sharing which could result in less competitive 
abilities. 
- Partner with bank/financial institute – bank/financial institute takes assets. 
Ericsson gets a better balance sheet, but at a cost to the banks. Ericsson 
hires local contractors etc. as usual when delivering site solutions to 
customers. 
 Risks – higher costs, lack of knowledge of leasing concept, and 
reduced profits or higher fees for the customer which in turn can 
lead to less competitive abilities. 
- Partner with infrastructure providers – infrastructure providers take the 
assets and the responsibility of delivering a finished site infrastructure to 
Ericsson, who in turn installs required equipment, leases it, and manages it 
to the customers. 
 Risks – possibly higher costs, lack of knowledge of leasing 
concept, and infrastructure providers’ lack of resources to meet 
growth of business.
- Partner with tower company – tower company takes assets, share their 
knowledge of how to leverage a shared infrastructure solution, and are 
responsible of building the site together with Ericsson and other 
infrastructure suppliers. An exchange of information takes place, Ericsson 
share knowledge of market and tower company share knowledge of 
business.
 Risks – relatively complicated partnership with identified 
unwanted high “strings attached”. The more sharing the more the 
partnership turn into a joint venture. The estimated large 
differences in corporate culture between one of the big 
international tower companies and Ericsson can result in an 
unsuccessful venture. Other risks include higher costs, tower 
company takes too much control over business resulting in 
Ericsson being a supplier to them, Ericsson get detached from 
business, and has shared knowledge of market to potential 
competitor.
6.3.3 Risk Findings
The biggest opportunity usually lies with the first mover, but they also have to take the 
largest risks. It can be concluded that a company always has to take risks to continue 
growing and surviving in the market place, the question is if the risks are too high.
The financial risk analysis has provided with the insight that the business is not immortal 
even though it is strong. When entering a new business many unexpected turns can take 
place in the first years. These turns can shift the business into a non-profitable one. The 
business is expected to hold for some of these risks, but not all. Still, the answer to the 
above question, if the risks are too high, can be concluded to be negative. Most of these 
risks will emerge in an early stadium resulting in a relative fast understanding of how the 
business will proceed. If the outlook does not look good enough, a quick exist, through 
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selling of the sites to competitors or back to operators, is estimated to recover most of the 
initial investments.   
Some kind of partner is most likely needed for carrying the assets completely or partially. 
After analyzing the alternatives it has been concluded that a bank/financial institute is 
probably the easiest and most straight forward solution to overcome the financial 
challenges. Partnering with any of the infrastructure providers is not a realistic solution 
since the goal of the partnership is financial backing and neither of the providers in the 
markets is estimated to be reliable in such terms. It is concluded that infrastructure 
providers as partners can’t add any value to Ericsson’s service. Partnering with a 
bank/financial institute will not give any knowledge in the leasing field or overcome the 
brand recognition barrier, but compared to the alternative of partnering with a tower 
company, it is viewed as more beneficial since it is less complicated and less risky. An 
identified possibility to overcome the knowledge barrier is instead to get it from the 
leasing business via recruitment of A or B listed people from the tower industry abroad.  
It is also estimated that Ericsson has such a strong brand name in relating fields that the 
barrier will be reduced. A partnership with a tower company is likely to be too time 
consuming, and as this has never been done before, it is probably more risky and can 
result in a longer time to market.
6.4 Analyses Findings
One could say that Ericsson is an adapter to the future and local needs with this new 
business. The statement is concluded from the company’s ambition to capture new 
opportunities in an existing market. The various analyses above show the outlook for 
these ambitions in India. 
The sensitivity analysis showed that number of tenants per towers and size of rental fees 
are two sensitive variables. A negative trend in these variables can turn the business to a 
non-profitable one. The analysis also showed that if Ericsson should decide to build more 
towers it would increase the profitability.   
The barriers of entry analysis showed that Ericsson’s highest barriers were their unknown 
brand name in the tower leasing industry, the high capital requirements and hence the 
need to find a financial partner to take the assets, and their lack of knowledge in the 
leasing field. 
The five forces analysis concluded that the best position for Ericsson to defend them self 
against the identified forces was to create a financially strong unit with aggressive initial 
investments. 
The SWOT analysis simply pointed out the areas which need attention, as the people and 
communication issue, and the areas which place Ericsson in an advantageous position 
compared to competitors. Such advantages included Ericsson’s wide spanning telecom 
knowledge, knowledge of market, and existing access to distribution and suppliers. 
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The risk analysis concluded that four main risks exist which have the potential to turn the 
business into a non-profitable one. The business will most likely stay profitable if one or 
maybe two of these risks realizes to a moderate extent, but not all. It is further believed 
that all of them can be discovered at an early stadium, thus the possibility to plan exit 
strategies quickly, resulting in a recovery of most of the initial investments. It is therefore 
concluded that the benefits exceed the risks. The risk analysis also summarized that the 
best financial partner is a bank or financial institute. The partner risk analysis furthermore 
suggests that Ericsson could gain more competence in the field by recruiting A and/or B 
listed people from the tower industry abroad.
Through these analyses it has been found that to minimize losses a pilot project should 
first be introduced, similar to the governmental initiative. If the pilot proves to attract 
operators and give an incentive of improved customer relations then Ericsson should start 
a more aggressive approach. The aggressive investment approach means to supply the 
market at a high speed and in a large scale, while focusing initially on areas where 
demand for increased capacity is high. With such a strategy risks are minimized, threats 
of competition lessened, and market opportunities and strengths like economies of scale 
and market knowledge taken advantage of. This will be further discussed in the entry 
proposal in the following chapter. 
6.5 Key Findings
The key findings of this chapter are presented below.
- If a project length of 10 years is assumed and 15,000 towers built then the 
cumulated profit can be expected to turn positive in year 5, a positive NPV (= 
274 million USD) achieved, PB period = 5.3 years, and IRR = 17.6%. 
- Three major groups of competitors have been distinguished, mentioned in 
order with highest threat first; tower companies, infrastructure providers, and 
equipment vendors.
- The industry rivalry is expected to be high in concentration, with few players 
dominating the market.
- An unfulfilled customer need is identified as the most important opportunity 
when entering the business. 
- Expected benefits are believed to exceed the financial risks.
- The “partner” alternative with the least risk is estimated to be a bank or a 
financial institute.
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7. Entry Strategy Conclusion
From the analyses presented in the previous chapter it is now believed that sufficient 
knowledge is achieved to answer the question which was the main purpose of the thesis; 
how to enter the “telecom site leasing” business. The coming chapter will present an 
internal action plan for Ericsson to follow to prepare the organization for a successful 
entrance. The chapter will also conclude the complete external and internal entrance 
plan and present some areas which are recommended for further studies.
7.1 Action Plan Model
Many cornerstones are needed to build a successful 
and sustainable strategy for a new business idea, even 
though many good opportunities are present. There 
exist several industry examples where companies
only achieve a part of their strategies’ potential value 
because of the lack of a thorough plan of execution
(Mankins & Steele, 2005). In order to succeed all the 
way, a solidly grounded realistic plan of execution, or 
entry strategy, is needed. With such a plan, shortfalls 
can quicker be taken action against and the strategy 
turned into great performance. 
A general plan of execution has been developed in 
order to easier identify missing pieces to achieve 
expected performance and to prioritize the right step 
at the right point in time (see figure 7.1). Even though 
the plan is general, it is constructed to suit the service 
sector and more specific; Ericsson’s entry in the 
infrastructure sharing business.
Identify business opportunities, is the first step an 
idea must take to create interest. While identifying the 
opportunities, an industry- and company -analysis 
needs to be performed to get a picture of the idea’s 
competitive abilities. Such analysis could be the 
above used five forces and SWOT. Questions like if 
the company have the required resources to bring the 
idea to the market, should furthermore be answered in 
this step. 
Get management support, is crucial in order to 
pursue the idea to the next step. The management 
support does not necessarily mean backing to 
leverage the idea to the market, but it means approval 
Identify Business 
Opportunities
Get Management 
Support
Calculate a Cost 
Analysis
Perform a Price 
Model
Find Financial 
Support
Get Workforce 
Support
Approach 
Customer
Monitor
Figure 7.1. A general entry 
strategy plan.
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of further investigating of it at a broader level. 
Calculate a cost analysis, to understand the possibility of the business and the abilities 
of the company in financial terms.   
Perform a price model, to find a suitable pricing strategy. How should the 
product/service be priced under various market situations? Perform a market analysis and 
develop a pricing model thereafter. 
Find financial support, if needed. Different possible partners should be contacted and 
analyzed.
Get workforce support, to finally leverage the solution to the market. The in-house 
support from top managers to salesmen is needed to reach the customers. Clear and 
simple communication with e.g. a rigorous framework is a recommendation (Mankins & 
Steele, 2005). Motivation of the staff to actually sell the new service is an important 
factor for successful performance. One way to create higher motivation is through reward 
systems.
Approach the customer, is a natural step, but the timing is important to consider. When 
the customer is approached the business should be ready for it including the work force, 
top management, the suppliers, and the partners. A decent proposition which takes a 
strategic standpoint needs to be ready.  
Monitor, is recommended to follow results and correct dissatisfying performance in time 
(Mankins & Steele, 2005). Key performance indicators (KPI) are a commonly used 
instrument for the purpose.  
7.1.1 A Suggested Ericsson Action Plan
The above general entry strategy plan will below be applied to an Ericsson context. Note 
that the model is, as all models are, a simplified picture of the real world. The aim of the 
model is to easier identify various issues and challenges and overcome these to achieve 
enhanced performance when leveraging the business. One needs to go through each step 
at a time and analyze it in an objective manner to identify gaps and new risks.  
The two first stages; “identify business opportunities” and “get management support”, 
will not be further elaborated on, since both have already been executed.  
Calculate a cost analysis
Challenges – identifying all costs included in the business. 
Analysis solution – encourage more communication within the unit to get as many inputs 
to the cost calculations as possible.
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Perform a price model
Challenges – place oneself price wise 
strategically in the market. What is a 
reasonable margin to achieve 
profitability but also price competing 
abilities.
Analysis solution – compare to other 
markets where similar solutions are 
present and communicate with customers 
to understand their expectations (see also 
“entry strategy conclusion and 
discussion” below for further findings).
Find financial support
Challenges – risks with financial 
“partner” as discussed in chapter 6.3.2.
Analysis solution – go with a 
bank/financial institute partner to 
minimize risks.
Get workforce support
Challenges – reach, get acceptance, and 
communicate the importance of the 
business to the sales team. 
Analysis solution – top management 
influence is of importance. To motivate 
further a reward system could be a 
possible solution.
Approach the customer
Challenges – persuading the customer of 
the benefits with the business to 
overcome their sharing conservatism. 
Also, the unifying of Ericsson people in 
order to approach the customer with a 
solution that everybody has understood and supports. 
Analysis solution – present to the customers in a simple and clear fashion all the benefits 
of sharing in a five year time horizon. Support the proposal with strong in-house 
communication. 
Monitor
Challenges – find the right KPIs which reflect the business.
Analysis solution – suggested KPIs are profitability, OPEX, customer satisfaction, and 
average sharing per tower. 
Identify Business 
Opportunities
Get Management 
Support
Calculate a Cost 
Analysis
Perform a Price 
Model
Find Financial 
Support
Get Workforce 
Support
Approach 
Customer
Monitor
Under 
progress 
Need priority 
now
Not done, 
need attention  
Done 
Figure 7.2. A suggested entry strategy plan for 
Ericsson.
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7.2 Entry Strategy Conclusion and Discussion 
The Ericsson action plan, presented above, discussed a plan how to internally prepare for 
the entrance of the business. Even though this is very important, it is not enough for a 
successful business entrance. An external strategy, meaning how Ericsson should 
strategically place itself in the industry, when, and through which partner as discussed in 
the previous chapter’s analyses findings, is also of equal importance. Together these 
internal and external strategic findings make a total plan of entry. Through these findings 
a complete answer can finally be presented to the main purpose of the thesis; how to 
successfully enter the “telecom site leasing” business. The result of the thesis is hence 
concluded and discussed below. 
It is clear and recommended that Ericsson should try to differentiate the “telecom site 
leasing” service (see figure 7.3 below). The differentiation strategy is supported by the 
SWOT and “barriers of entry” analyses, which showed that Ericsson has capabilities to 
deliver a service with perceived benefits. These benefits are the ability to supply the 
customers with a complete solution, from building to maintaining and operating all parts 
of the network. The need for the operators to only stop at a one stop shop is believed to 
create a strong competitive position. Since neither of the competitors is likely to be 
capable of matching such an offering, Ericsson would with this strategy be able to 
support a slightly higher price. The barriers for competitors to reach this position are
expected to be high since the knowledge that Ericsson holds stem from their high barrier 
core activities and their long presence in the market. Ericsson would, in other words, be 
able to be alone in this position. 
’No frills’
Low price
Hybrid
Differentiation
Focused 
differentiation
Strategies 
destined for 
ultimate failure
Low
High
High
Price
Perceived 
product/service 
benefits
Low
Figure 7.3. Ericsson’s service applied to the strategy clock (adapted from Johnson, Scholes, and 
Wittington, 2005)
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It is now clear where Ericsson should position its service in the industry, but when and 
how the service should first be presented is still questionable. From the analyses findings 
in the previous chapter it was found that a pilot project should first be introduced. 
Rushing to the market seldom proves to be a success. A pilot project would also 
minimize some of the risks identified in the financial risk analysis. It was found that the 
risk of sharing reluctance, affecting customer relations negatively, unexpected drop in 
rental revenues, and hidden project costs are all risks which are estimated to surface at an 
early stadium. A pilot is therefore a smart move to quickly get an insight of how the 
industry will evolve. A good start of the pilot project could be bidding for some of the 
USO funded sites, depending on the timing of the governmental start of the bidding. 
After an evaluation of the pilot project, in a time effective manner, Ericsson should start a 
more aggressive approach, assuming the evaluation returned positive results. The 
aggressive approach strategy is supported by the sensitivity-, “barriers of entry”-, five 
forces, and SWOT –analysis. From these analyses it was found that Ericsson in this way 
creates a more profitable business and higher barriers for new entrants.
In the sensitivity analysis it was showed that when building 5000 more towers the net 
present value increased. Initial investment obviously increases thus the longer pay back 
period, but in the long term it is a more profitable strategy.
From the “barriers of entry” analysis it can be concluded that such a strategy reinforces 
entrance barriers through higher capital requirements, economies of scale, brand 
recognition, and access to distribution channels. Three of these barriers; the capital 
requirement, economies of scale, and access to distribution channels, are strengths that 
Ericsson has, compared to competitors. These advantages are something that Ericsson
should take advantage of in its entry strategy. It is also expected that the strategy would 
easier overcome Ericsson’s brand recognition barrier, compared to the tower companies, 
through the creation of a strong foothold in the industry faster than tower-competitors. 
The SWOT analysis also showed that the brand recognition barrier should, compared to 
other competitors, decrease since Ericsson’s high quality reputation in relating fields.       
The five forces analysis further supports the aggressive entry strategy, because if it’s 
cleverly positioning of Ericsson in the industry. It was found that it decreases the power 
of three of Porter’s forces; threats of new entrants, industry rivalry, and the bargaining 
power of customers. The reduction in the power of these forces is connected to each 
other; the higher entrance barriers created by the strategy result in a more consolidated 
industry, which in its turn decreases the bargaining power of the customers. An 
aggressive entrance strategy would thus create higher incentives for a more profitable 
business. 
Through the partner risk analysis it was found that financial support will most likely be 
needed and wanted from an outside partner. The idea is that the outside partner will take 
the assets incurred with owning sites on their balance sheet. Together with a suitable 
financial partner, believed to be a bank/financial institute, investments to supply the 
market in a high speed and in a large scale will therefore easier be achieved. Initial focus 
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should be in areas where operator demand for increased capacity is high, as in urban and 
metropolitan areas. The risk analysis also proposes an idea to decrease the barrier “cost 
disadvantages independent on size” compared to entering tower companies. The possible 
cost disadvantage for Ericsson was the tower company’s superior knowledge in the tower
leasing industry. A suggested solution is to recruit A and/or B listed people from the 
tower industry abroad.
To support the aggressive entrance strategy it is important that the workforce and 
salesmen have before the start understood the importance of the business. If not, 
management needs to push the importance of the new service down the organization 
through meetings and general communication. To emphasize the need to kick start the 
business to the salesmen further, a possibility is a change in the reward system. The 
change would imply higher rewards for sales of this particular service. Reward systems 
as means of control is a commonly used tool in the industry, specially liked by American 
companies. It is believed that the pilot project will create attention among the workforce 
and salesmen, but that extra push will be needed.   
When approaching the customer with the strategic plan it is of importance to stress the 
benefits of the service. In order to do so, Ericsson must be unified in their communication 
with the customers and through a clear business-case show all the advantages. Compared 
to the traditional equipment vendor competitors’ offerings, Ericsson now competes with a 
hybrid strategy in the infrastructure service segment (see figure 7.4 below). Assuming 
that these competitors do not enter the tower industry, Ericsson now competes with a 
broader service portfolio with perceived benefits to a lower price than the traditional 
service package, where customers owns their own sites. Ericsson must make these 
benefits; a better service to a lower price, crystal clear to the operators.
’No frills’
Low price
Hybrid
Differentiation
Focused 
differentiation
Strategies 
destined for 
ultimate failure
Low
High
High
Price
Perceived 
product/service 
benefits
Low
Figure 7.4. Ericsson’s strategic position in the infrastructure service segment, with the “telecom site 
leasing” service, compared to the traditional equipment vendor competitors (picture adapted from 
Johnson, Scholes, and Wittington, 2005).
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It is finally recommended to monitor the business carefully to continuously evaluate if 
the results match the expectations. One suggestion of such monitoring is to use key 
performance indicators. These indicators should foremostly reflect performance in risk 
zone areas, identified in the sensitivity- and financial risk –analysis. 
The concluded entrance strategy is believed to minimize risks and threats of fierce 
competition, but also take full advantage of Ericsson strengths and market opportunities.
Note that the strategy does not initially solve the problem of the rural slow network 
implementation development. Through bidding on some of the USO funded sites in the 
pilot project it contributes, but after that it is recommended to focus on metropolitan and 
urban areas where demand is high. In the longer term on the other hand, it will probably 
contribute, since if service proves to be successful an expansion including these areas is 
inevitable. 
7.3 Recommendations for Further Studies
One of the largest identified risks is the uncertainty of the market; the risk of Ericsson not 
being able to attract enough tenants to each site to make the business profitable. To 
minimize this risk it is therefore recommended that the company should perform an into 
depth market analysis to get a better understanding of the real potential of the market. It 
is further recommended to hire a consultant company, which would be more neutral, to 
investigate this issue.
A possibility to overcome some of the internal challenges is to conduct a study of the 
knowledge and support of the workforce for the “telecom site leasing” business. The 
study would hopefully show the gaps of knowledge of management and workforce and 
present some suggestions in order to motivate the salesmen more.
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Appendixes
Appendix I – Definitions
The following definitions will be given to clarify the language and terminology used in 
the paper. Most of the terms are commonly confused and to prevent any 
misunderstandings some general clarifications are needed. 
ARPU – Average Revenue Per User. Average monthly revenue for per subscriber.
2G
The second generation network differs from the first generation mainly by the digital 
voice data transfer. The 1G technology uses an analog voice transfer, but note that both 
use digital signaling to connect to the telecom towers. The 2G systems technology 
standards will be listed below. 
 GSM (TDMA based) – Europe based but used worldwide.
 iDen (TDMA based), used in USA and Canada, exclusively provided by Nextel 
in US and Telus Mobility in Canada.
 IS – 136 (TDMA based), used in the Americas and simply referred to TDMA.
 IS – 95 (CDMA based), used in the Americas and parts of Asia and Australia. 
Often simply referred to CDMA. In this paper it will be referred to the CDMA 
standard.
 PDC (TDMA based), used in Japan. 
The primary advantage of the digital voice data is that it is compressed in such a high 
degree that the same bandwidth allows more calls compared to the first generation. Also, 
other digital data services such as SMS and email is possible to use with the 2G network.
3G
The difference between the third generation technology and the second generation 
technology is the ability to transfer both voice data and non-voice data (e.g. 
downloading) substantially faster. The higher data exchange in the 3G network compared 
to the 2G has been made possible with the high capacity broadband capabilities. 3G is 
supported by the WCDMA and CDMA2000 technologies, the GSM standard allied with 
the WCDMA and the CDMA standard with CDMA2000. The 3G technology has not yet 
been implemented in India. Governmental goal is to reach a 3G subscription base to 21.3 
million by 2010 (ICT World Team, 2006).  
CDMA
CDMA stands for Code Division Multiple Access. As with the definition of the TDMA 
technology, a general explanation will be given. 
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The CDMA technology encodes the voice data with a specific code to identify every user 
and segment the channel into multiple channels. The technology is more immune to 
interference than TDMA and can supposedly support more users. 
Free Cash Flow 
A firm’s cash flow after all expenditures. Calculated as operating cash flow minus capital 
expenditures.
GPRS
GPRS stands for General Packet Radio Service. The technology is a GSM technology 
often referred to 2.5G, meaning the technology generation between 2G and 3G.
GSM
GSM stands for Global System for Mobile communication and is a mobile technology 
network standard. It is the most popular standard used worldwide. It is one of the 
standards from the TDMA based technology. 
Mobile phones stay connected to the GSM network by a continuous search for cells (the 
closest telecom tower). The cell radius’ varies depending on the height of the antennae on 
the tower, the higher the tower the larger the radius. The longest distance the system can 
support is 35 km. 
GSM works in four different frequencies, the most common being 900 Hz and 1800 Hz. 
In the Americas (USA and Canada) they use frequencies of 850 Hz and 1900 Hz, because 
the two other were already occupied. 
Revenue share – Service which enables the operators to fully or partially pay for their 
equipment and or services via a percentage of their incurred revenue for a negotiated time 
period.
Telecom Network (GSM)
A GSM telecom network is divided into three main parts;
 The mobile station; subscriber’s mobile phone.
 The cell site: transmitter, receiver, radio base station, and radio base station 
controller. The base station subsystem is the components which handles the traffic 
from the cell site to the switching subsystem.
 The switching subsystem. The component which carries out the switching 
functions and connects the mobile calls into the public telephone network. The 
switching subsystem is often referred to the network’s core system.  
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TDMA
TDMA stands for Time Division Multiple Access. No into depth explanation will be 
given of the technology because of its complexity. A general understanding of the 
concept is sufficient for the purpose of the paper. 
The main concept of the technology is its ability to share the same channel between users 
by dividing it into timeslots. The timeslots are large enough to access a call from a 
mobile 35 km from the base station. A mobile just next to a telecom tower will with no 
time delay be transmitted while a broadcast from a mobile just less than 35 km from the 
tower will arrive at the base station at the very end of the slot.   
WCDMA 
WCDMA stands for Wideband Code Division Multiple Access. It is a GSM allied 3G 
technology
Base Station and subsystem The switching subsystemMobile Station Receiver 
mobile/fixed
Figure 1.1. A simplified GSM network structure. 
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Appendix IIa) – Tower Estimations Spreadsheet
Appendix Ia shows the calculated cumulated number of new towers needed to cover for the subscription growth expectations. The 
calculations assume that all towers from now onwards will be shared by 2.5 operators. A further reduction in the need for new towers 
is expected if an increase of sharing of the already built towers will take place. To include this expectation it is estimated that by 2010 
50%25 more 2-operator sharing on existing towers will be realized. The calculations from 2006 to 2010 can be seen in the table below. 
Cumulated Nbr. of Towers Estimations
Estimated nbr. of new towers 2006 - 2007, gov. (thousands) 70
Nbr. of less towers needed, due to increased sharing on existing towers 0 0% more of existing towers shared by 2 operators
Average number of tenants/tower 2.5
Nbr. of new shared towers in market (thousands) 28 (= (70-0)/2.5 = 28)
Estimated nbr. of new towers 2006 - 2008, gov. (thousands) 140
Nbr. of less towers needed, due to increased sharing on existing towers 21 30% more of existing towers shared by 2 operators
Average number of tenants/tower 2.5
Total nbr. of new shared towers in market (thousands) 48 (= (140-21)/2.5 = 47)
Estimated nbr. of new towers 2006 - 2009, gov. (thousands) 210
Nbr. of less towers needed, due to increased sharing on existing towers 35 50% more of existing towers shared by 2 operators
Average number of tenants/tower 2.5
Total nbr. of new shared towers in market (thousands) 70 (= (210-35)/2.5 = 70)
Estimated nbr. of new towers 2006 - 2010, gov. (thousands) 280
Nbr. of less towers needed, due to increased sharing on existing towers 35 50% more of existing towers shared by 2 operators
Average number of tenants/tower 2.5
Total nbr. of new shared towers in market (thousands) 98 (= (280-35)/2.5 = 98)
                                                
25 Ericsson estimations.
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Appendix IIb) – Tower Cost Estimations Spreadsheet
Appendix Ib shows the cumulated cost calculations per operator of the new towers needed to cover for subscription growth 
expectations. The calculations assume, as above, that all towers from now onwards will be shared by 2.5 operators. Since each shared 
tower needs to be stronger and bigger, it is assumed that a cost increase of 20% will be realized per tower. Another assumption which 
has been made is that the passive infrastructure cost of a site is equal to a ground based site in Delhi. The calculations from 2006 to 
2010 can be seen in the table below.
Cumulated Infrastructure Cost per Operator of New Shared Towers
Estimated nbr. of new towers 2006 - 2007 28.0
Cost/tower/operator, single operator/tower (USD in thousands) 129.1 source: Financial Express 2006, based on ground based Delhi tower infra. cost
Cost/tower/operator, 2.5 operators/new tower (USD) 62.0
20% cost increase of tower construction divided by an average 
of 2.5 tenants per site
Cumulated cost of new shared towers (USD in millions) 1.7
Estimated nbr. of new towers 2006 - 2008 47.6
Cost/tower/operator, single operator/tower (USD in thousands) 129.1
Cost/tower/operator, 2.5 operators/new tower (USD) 62.0
Cumulated cost of new shared towers (USD in millions) 2.9
Estimated nbr. of new towers 2006 - 2009 70.0
Cost/tower/operator, single operator/tower (USD in thousands) 129.1
Cost/tower/operator, 2.5 operators/new tower (USD) 62.0
Cumulated cost of new shared towers (USD in millions) 4.3
Estimated nbr. of new towers 2006 - 2010 98.0
Cost/tower/operator, single operator/tower (USD in thousands) 129.1
Cost/tower/operator, 2.5 operators/new tower (USD) 62.0
Cumulated cost of new shared towers (USD in millions) 6.1
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Appendix III – Current Players in Site Leasing Business
Active players in the Indian market which could pose as a competitive threat is presented 
below. 
Tower Companies
Tower Vision
Tower Vision is an U.K. based tower company, which have recently entered the Indian 
tower market. They have an agreement with Spice to build and lease out 1,000 tower 
sites. It is believed that these sites will be shared with other operators. 
Infrastructure Providers
Quipo Telecom Infrastructure Pvt Ltd.
Quipo is currently not a threat to Ericsson, but they are pushing into the shared 
infrastructure business and thus could become a competitor to Ericsson. Quipo has their 
background in infrastructure equipment leasing business. They claim that they are 
currently negotiating roll-out of 200 “shared” sites in the next 3-6 months. Quipo has 
realized the necessity to acquire partnership in technology, project management, and 
souring, in order to support a project management role in the business. Their business 
idea is to let the anchor tenant choose the best position for its equipment. Subsequent 
tenants will get next best suitable position according to their requirements. Discounts will 
be given on shared towers on the basis of the revenue generated from the subsequent 
operators. Their pricing strategy is based on an encouragement for multiple operators to 
share each site.     
Aster Teleservices Pvt Ltd.
Aster is an infrastructure provider which offers services in engineering, construction and 
projects, project management, infrastructure, operations and maintenance, and RF (radio 
frequency) engineering services. No information regarding if they are planning to go into 
the infrastructure sharing business can be found on their website. The company is still 
viewed as a possible future competitor with regard to their knowledge base and customer 
contacts. It is believed that Aster has the capability to offer infrastructure sharing 
solutions directly to the operators. Moreover, Aster has an alliance with Ericson when it 
comes to GSM equipment services and installation. An alliance in one field does not 
mean that the same company can’t be a competitor in another.  
GTL Infrastructure (GIL)
GIL is a subsidiary of GTL which provides infrastructure services in telecom. As of May 
2006 this new service is still in the planning stage. The company will own, operate, and 
provide passive infrastructure, including towers, air-conditioning facilities, shelters, 
diesel generators, battery back up, and related site structures (ground based and roof top 
sites) for co-locating active elements owned by different operators. The company has 
further plans to provide operation and maintenance services with regard to the passive 
infrastructure. They believe that they will not go into the business of sharing electronic 
infrastructure elements such as antennae. Therefore, the operators would have to maintain 
and install their own antennae and radio network equipment (Gupta, 2006). The reason is 
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concluded to be a lack of competence. It is possible that the result can be less competitive 
power. 
GIL has currently around 1,300 sites across the country. They have a goal of owning 
12,000 sites in the next three years, including acquisitions of existing non-shared sites. 
Their price model is based on an approximate fee of about 1,000 USD/month (Rs 
45,000/month). When the site reaches a shared status the first tenant will get a 35% 
discount and the second a 65% discount. They have a limit of five operators to share a 
site. 
The mother company, GTL, has experience in the field of telecom engineering since 
long. Their services include site construction, site engineering, passive equipment 
installation, testing and integration, training, planning, design, and tests. GIL may have
easier to expand in the passive infrastructure business because of this.  
ITI Limited
ITI offer services like; network planning, design, engineering, survey, installation, 
commissioning and maintenance, civil works (such as construction of buildings, 
towers/mast, and external cable plant). Even though they do not mention any plans to 
move in to the infrastructure sharing business, they could be potential competitors since 
they sit on knowledge in the field. 
Himachal Futuristic Communications Ltd (HFCL) Group
HFCL offers a wide range of shared infrastructure related services, such as civil works, 
installation of equipment, site surveys, etc. HFCL are most likely not able to offer a 
infrastructure sharing business to operators since they currently don’t have experience in 
maintenance and operations in the area. They have on the other hand a quite wide 
experience in the site infrastructure business in general and thus could together with a 
partner become a dangerous competitor. 
Nutek 
Nutek could be a threat due to their offerings in all areas of telecommunication from 
design to installation and operations & maintenance. Note that Ericsson has used Nutek 
to develop Jammu and Kashmir non-shared sites. As with most of the above 
infrastructure providers, Nutek may face financial difficulties to support a tower leasing 
business. With a financial partner it is estimated that Nutek has the capabilities to grow 
their business into site leasing. No such plans are stated on their website. 
